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NOTE
TITLE IX SEX DISCRIMINATION REGULATIONS:
IMPACT ON PRIVATE EDUCATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' was de-
signed to "eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex in any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance .... -2 Senator Birch Bayh, the author of Title IX,
stated that it is:
[A]n important first step in the effort to provide for the
women of America something that is rightfully theirs-an
equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, to develop
the skills they want, and to apply these skills with the knowl-
edge that they will have a fair chance to secure the jobs of
their choice with equal pay for equal work.'
The responsibility for enforcing Title IX was assigned to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and on
June 4, 1975, HEW issued its regulations.4 These regulations
have been the subject of great controversy, with much of the
discussion centering around the provisions on athletics.5 But
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972) et seq. Title IX provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance," with certain exceptions.
These exceptions include private undergraduate school admissions, 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a)(1) (1972); religious schools, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1972); military schools, 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (1972); traditionally one-sex schools, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1972);
and maintenance of separate living facilities for men and women, 20 U.S.C. § 1686
(1972).
2 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (1976).
118 CONG. REc. S5808 (1972).
45 C.F.R. § 86 (1976).
45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1976). For an incomplete sampling of the debate over athlet-
ics, see Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecon-
dary Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 46 (statement of Darrell Royal, President, Am. Football
Coaches Assn.), 71 (statement of Kathy Kelly, President, U.S. Nat'l Student Assn.),
98 (statement of John A. Fuzak, President, NCAA), and 123 (statement of Laurie
Mabry, President, Assn. of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Hearings].
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criticism has come from all sectors of society concerning nearly
every provision of the regulations. As Congressman John
O'Hara stated in opening the congressional hearings on the
Title IX regulations: "Some have suggested they do not carry
out the law in its full vigor. Others have suggested they go
beyond the limits of the law. Almost no one has written in so
far to endorse the regulations as developed by HEW."' The
private sector of higher education has been particularly dis-
turbed by the Title IX regulations. This paper will analyze the
actual and potential effect of the Title IX regulations on pri-
vate educational institutions.
A. Federal Regulation of Education
The impact of the Title IX regulations on private higher
education can only be seen in proper perspective against a
background of the entire scope of federal regulations concern-
ing education. The Title IX regulations compose only a small
number of the vast quantity of bureaucratic orders which affect
educational institutions. 7 The main concern has been over the
affirmative action programs which are designed to eliminate
discrimination through the use of goals and timetables. En-
forcement of these programs is achieved by terminating all
federal funds to noncomplying parties.
Affirmative action was instituted in the 1960's' under the
1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 2.
The following is a brief sampling of the federal acts which directly affect educa-
tional institutions. It does not include regulations directed only at educational institu-
tions, such as the Title IX regulations.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972; Equal Pay Act of 1963; Employment Act of 1967; Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938; Social Security Act of 1935-Employment Security Amend-
ments, 1970; Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973; Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974; Economic Stabilization Act of 1970; Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970; Environment Protection Act of 1972. These acts were used in
a June, 1976 study of the cost effect of federal programs in education by the American
Council on Education. See note 21 infra.
A proposed regulation which may never be issued, but which poses a serious
threat, is a regulation that would permit a government agency to judge accreditation
of an institution on the basis of compliance with federal mandates. This is a potential
invasion of education by the government. See ExEcuTIVES' CLUS NZws, Oct. 15, 1976,
at 6.
. The present day affirmative action programs have evolved from the days of John
Kennedy, when the term was merely a political slogan, through Exec. Order No. 11,246
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assumption that minorities and women had been discrimi-
nated against in the past.' As one supporter of affirmative ac-
tion stated: "I start from the position that blacks and women
have in the past been excluded by discrimination from univer-
sity faculties [and] that the few that have been hired have
been unfairly treated in the matter of promotion and pay."'0
While this assumption is valid, the next step taken by the
federal bureaucracy in implementing affirmative action pro-
grams was to obligate educational institutions to meet goals
and timetables in the hiring of minorities and women." The
problem with this system is that the same basic program which
was devised for hiring construction workers in the 1960's is used
today in educational institutions for hiring faculty. "[Tihey
do not make allowance for quality judgments, appearing to
regard the Ph.D. simply as being in the same category as a
machinist's union card.' 2 While it may be valid to expect cer-
tain quotas on a construction job, it seems absurd to expect the
same in education where faculty hiring and firing should be on
the basis of merit. Unfortunately, "goals" have replaced merit
as the criteria for selection of faculty members.'3 As might be
signed by President Johnson pursuant to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, through Revised
Order No. 4 issued by the Department of Labor to implement President Johnson's
executive order with regard to the construction industry. The Revised Order No. 4
required an analysis of areas where the contractor with the federal government was
deficient in hiring minorities and women, and then required that goals and timetables
be set up to correct the deficiencies. By 1971, enforcement of Revised Order No. 4
became the responsibility of HEW whenever colleges and universities were involved.
For a concise history of affirmative action programs, see G. C. ROCHE, I, THE BALAc-
ING Acr 7-9 (1974).
1 121 CONG. REc. E6944-5 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1975) (statement of Barbara R. Berg-
mann, Comm. on the Status of Women in Econs. Professions of the Am. Educ. Ass'n
that: "discrimination has been documented with respect to pay."). See also 121 CONG.
REc. E6944 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1975).
90 121 CoNG. REc., supra note 9, at E6945.
" HEW has carefully avoided setting "quotas" since quotas per se are a violation
of the Civil Rights Act. However, colleges have been setting their own quotas to be sure
they are in compliance with affirmative action programs. See G. C. ROCHE III, supra
note 8, at 5.
12 Letter from Carleton Whitehead, Affirmative Action compliance officer at Reed
College, Portland, Ore., to the author (October 19, 1976).
,3 This is particularly significant for this paper because the authors of Title IX,
which covers sex discrimination, have expressed their opinion that merit should be the
basis for hiring faculty. Rep. Edith Green, who originally authored Title IX in the
House, stated: "It seems to me that individuals,. . . whether they are male or female,
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expected, educators forced to comply with these federal pro-
grams often object to being told whom to hire, fire and admit."
President John R. Hubbard of the University of Southern Cali-
fornia has expressed his objection to this infiltration of federal
control:
ought to be considered on their individual merit and individual talent and whether or
not they can do the work at that university." 117 CONG. REc. H39259 (1971). With
regard to quotas, she declared: "I am opposed to it even in terms of attempting to end
discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at H39262.
Birch Bayh, author of the Senate version of Title IX, agrees that merit is the only
proper way to hire faculty, but he has also expressed agreement with the same faulty
assumptions made in the affirmative action programs. He stated:
The language of my amendment does not require reverse discrimination. It
only requires that each individual be judged on merit, without regard to sex.
Of course, my amendment does not preclude a decision by enforcing
agencies to use comparisons between female and male admissions or hiring
rates as one indication of the presence or absence of sex discrimination.
118 CONG. REc. S18437 (1972). Senator Bayh seems to speak from both sides of his
mouth. He favors hiring on "merit, without regard to sex" but also says that the
absence of women in a job is an indication of discrimination. This logic assumes that
because no women work in a department, sex discrimination is the cause. This ap-
proach views discrimination in terms of results, not opportunities. Rather than policing
whether women are being given an opportunity to apply for a particular job, affirma-
tive action programs focus on whether women are currently in a particular job. This
view ignores the possibility that women may not be applying for the job. As a Carnegie
Commission study reported: "Much of what is loosely called sex discrimination in
employment is, at least partly, the consequence of choices made by women," in partic-
ular a choice made to pursue domestic responsibilities. [1975] 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAw
REPORTER 3, quoting from R. A. LESTER, ANTiBiAs REGULATION OF UNIvERSrrEs: FACULTY
PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS (1974).
"1 Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale, has stated in connection with the
Title IX regulations specifically, and affirmative action, generally:
We have been insistent that criminal and administrative regulations should
not go beyond what is rationally required by their stated purpose. We must
be no less vigilant about the use of spending power as a lever to extend
regulation beyond the accountability reasonably related to purposes for
which the support is given.
Address by Dallin H. Oaks, President, Brigham Young University, to National Assoc.
of College and University Attorneys (June 18, 1976), quoting from THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 22, (Yale University, 1974-75). William McGill, President of Columbia Uni-
versity, stated that the bureaucracy "must be served with a continuing diet of reports
and data about our progress in areas subject to regulatory review." Address by Dallin
H. Oaks, supra, quoting from Address by William McGill, 14 (Feb. 8, 1975). The
Presidents of the American University, Catholic University of Am., George Washing-
ton University and Georgetown University have stated: "This declaration we make in
the full and deliberate conviction that only by being strong and independent can our
universities fulfill their obligations to a free society." 122 CONG. REc. S8142-43 (daily
ed. May 27, 1976) (1976 Declaration of Independence).
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Do not tell me that there is some all-pervading omniscience
in Washington or Sacramento that knows better than I how
to run this University, that can perceive more clearly than I
what its standards and contributions ought to be, or whose
sense of the fitness of things is more enlightened and humane
than mine.'5
Educators insist that the Washington bureaucracy is suffo-
cating American education. In particular, they are being
smothered by the sheer weight of the paperwork involved in
complying with all federal regulations. Energies once devoted
to educational purposes are now expended on paperwork. One
group of educators state their concern:
In the past few years we have been overwhelmed by fed-
eral regulations and federal requirements for paperwork on a
wide range of programs.
It is not that we object to the goals. . . . It does us no
good . . . however, for the federal government to overwhelm
us with. . . demands for paperwork ...
• . . [This could] have a serious adverse impact on the
ability of our institutions to survive."6
This concern is well-founded. Harvard University reports that
compliance in 1974-75 required 60,000 hours of faculty time."
Administrators at smaller institutions report that twenty to
twenty-five percent of their time is spent on affirmative action
responsibilities, 8 and "unfortunately, nearly all of this is busy-
work, without any real merit."' 9 Even the Secretary of HEW,
David Matthews, a former educator, stated before assuming
15 Address by Dallin H. Oaks, supra note 14, quoting from TROJAN FAMILY, June-
July, 1976, at 1.
" 122 CONG. Rc. E1927 (daily ed. April 9, 1976) (letter from Oregon Independent
Colleges Assoc., Jim Sullivan, Exec. Dir., to Rep. Les AuCoin (March 19, 1976)).
17 Address by Dallin H. Oaks, supra note 14, quoting from D.C. BROK, THE
PRESIDEN r's REPORT, 1974-75 (Harvard University, 1975).
18 Berea College President Willis Weatherford estimates 25% of his time is so
spent. CHmsTuNrrY TODAY, November 5, 1976, at 16. Dr. Weatherford also expressed
concern about "the diversion of human energy of faculty and administration away from
the central educational task to paper shuffling." Letter from Dr. Weatherford to author
(Nov. 9, 1976). Mr. Carleton Whitehead of Reed College estimates 20% of his time is
spent on affirmative action compliance. Letter from Carleton Whitehead to author
(Oct. 19, 1976).
11 Letter from Carleton Whitehead, supra note 18.
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his position that the bureaucracy was "threatening to bind the
body of higher education in a Lilliputian nightmare of forms
and formulas.""0
Added paperwork is naturally accompanied by added
financial costs.2 The high cost of complying with federal pro-
grams is driving many institutions to the brink of financial
collapse. Indeed, it has been estimated that the total cost of
compliance has been $2 billion, which equals "the total of all
voluntary giving to institutions of higher learning."22 Add to
20 Address by Charles B. Saunders, Jr., Director of Governmental Relations,
American Council of Education, to Southern Regional Meeting of the College Entrance
Examination Board (Feb. 19, 1976), quoting from comments by David Matthews.
21 Costs of complying with federal programs place an additional burden on already
laboring educational institutions. A recent study of six colleges and universities by the
American Council on Education proves this. THE COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING FEDERALLY
MANDATED SOCIAL PROGRAMS AT COLLEGES AND UNIvERsrms, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION (1976) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION]. Some of the
conclusions included:
In the 1974-1975 academic year, the combined cost of implementing the
federally mandated social programs at the six institutions was $9-10 million
...The costs of implementing the federally mandated social programs
at these six institutionsl have doubled over the last five years - considerably
faster than increases in overall costs of instruction.
The social program costs represented from 5% to 18% of net tuition
revenues at the six institutions ....
Increased costs. . .on a per-student basis . . . ranged in 1974-75 from
$21 to $39 at the two large public institutions and from $129 to $164 at the
two small private institutions ....
[The] programs have contributed substantially to the instability of
costs at colleges and universities from year to year and thus compounded the
difficulties of financial management and budget balancing.
Id. at 14. The most alarming feature of the study is that proportionately the most
serious financial burden of these federal programs has fallen on small, private institu-
tions. This tends to further erode the financial stability of such schools, which are
already "walking a tightrope between extinction or distinction." Address by Eugene
B. Habecker, J. D., George Fox College, to National Assoc. of Evangelicals (April 8,
1975). It is also noted by the American Council on Education that they are "committed
to the objectives of the federally mandated social programs." AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION Study, supra, at iii. However, President Roger W. Heyns states that the
study "provides a basis for suggesting that improvements are needed-based on fuller
consultation between Congress, the federal agencies, and the higher education com-
munity-in drafting the legislation and in designing the implementation activities to
achieve those objectives." Id.
Most educators take the view that while there is nothing wrong with social pro-
grams, there is something wrong with the method of implementation.
" Address by Dallin H. Oaks, supra note 14, quoting from CHANGE, Winter, 1975-
76, at 10, 12.
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this the fact that affirmative action is not accomplishing its
goals, 23 and educators have good reason to complain. When the
cost of implementing affirmative action programs is enormous
in terms of both energy and time, and the effectiveness of the
program is suspect, it is not surprising that U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT recently reported: "A mood of rebellion is
spreading among college educators who are finding themselves
increasingly under the thumb of a benevolent despot-the fed-
eral bureaucracy. '
2
B. Effect on Private Education
Federal regulations have had an enormous effect on all
educational institutions, but the sector most profoundly and
adversely affected by the Title IX regulations is the nation's
private colleges and universities 5.2  These private institutions,
many of which accept no direct federal aid,2 fear that the
2 Thomas Sowell, professor of economics at UCLA, has thoroughly studied the
issue of the effectiveness of affirmative action programs. He concluded that they are
generally ineffective. THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter, 1976, at 47. By determining the
amount of discrimination in 1968-69 before affirmative action, and the amount in 1972-
73 after affirmative action was begun, he was able to compare the impact of these
programs on the elimination of discrimination. He found only a marginal increase in
participation of minorities and women "as far as the pay, employment, or promotions
of women and minorities are concerned. The American Council on Education data
show that blacks were 2.1% of academics in 1968-69 and 2.9% in 1972-73, while women
were 19.1% in 1968-69 and 20% in 1972-73." Id. at 57. Perhaps more significant was
his conclusion that while minorities and women are underrepresented statistically in
relation to their proportion of the general population, they are both "overrepresented
when measured as a percentage of the qualified supply." Id. at 55. So the problem is
not demand but supply, and it is here that the federal government ought to direct its
attention. They should support the training of minorities and women so that the
qualified supply of minorities and women will equal their proportion of the population.
Hiring minorities and women on the basis of the general population percentage when
the qualified supply is a smaller percentage can only lead to a lowering of educational
standards, since it means prima facie that some people are being hired even though
they are not qualified. Admittedly, it will be years before the supply of qualified
minorities and women equals their percentage of the population, but the quality of our
educational system should not be risked by instituting a system that tries to achieve
too much, too soon.
24 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 5, 1976, at 91. This article contains a
complete review of the education establishment's objections to the federal intrusion
into American education.
2 A recent study has shown that proportionately the most serious financial burden
of federally mandated social programs at colleges and universities has fallen on small,
private institutions. AMERicAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, supra note 21.
26 AMER. Assoc. OF PRES. OF INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND UNIV. REPORT [hereinafter
cited as AAPICU REPORT], Sept. 1976, at 2, reports that 26% of their member institu-
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independence and diversity of thought which they foster will be
lost if they are forced to comply with federal regulations. They
fear that the regulations "would impose a straitjacket that
would deprive private education of the diversity and flexibility
it must enjoy in order to make its distinctive contribution to
American higher education."'
To realize the importance of the issue, one must first real-
ize the importance of private higher education in America 8 and
that the success of private education" has been based in part
on its independence from the government .3  This independ-
ence, first established in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,31 permits the private institution to serve a function
different from that of a public university.3 In short, "private
universities . . . have a right to be different. ' 33 One educator
has stated:
For the [private] institution, freedom includes the freedom
to be different, to be self-motivated, to be true to its own
heritage, to be controlled from within and not from without.
Freedom of individual institutions leads to diversity among
institutions, whereas centralized control means uniformity,
monotony, mediocrity, and ultimately the loss of freedom
34
tions, which is a representative group of private institutions in the United States,
accept no direct federal assistance.
" 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 228 (statement of Dallin H. Oaks, President of
Brigham Young University and a Director and Secretary of the Amer. Assoc. of Pres.
of Independent Colleges and Univ.).
n See READER's DIGEST, Nov. 1976, at 91-96. The article lists four major reasons
why private institutions are important, including: 1) independent colleges are a major
national resource; 2) independent colleges promote diversity; 3) the colleges are inde-
pendent of political pressure; and 4) independent colleges promote human values.
" A national poll concluded that the top seven medical schools, five of the top six
business schools, and four of the best six law schools are private. The National Ob-
server, Feb. 1, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
See supra note 25.
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
2 "The public university serves the function of producing an educated citizenry,
fostering the state's concept of academic goals, and providing an opportunity for bet-
terment of all." Forum, Private Universities: The Right to be Different, 11 TuLsA L.J.
58, 67 (1975).
3 Id.
31 122 CONG. REc. E3498 (daily ed. June 21, 1976) (memorandum from Dr. Willis
D. Weatherford, Berea College, introduced into the CongressionalBecord by Rep. Tim
Lee Carter (Ky.)).
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Indeed, the most notable contribution private education offers
is diversity. Unlike public universities, they answer to no one
but themselves. This freedom from government influence al-
lows private institutions to experiment and to apply a higher
standard of academic excellence and moral character than the
government would require or even allow. 35 "Private universities
• ..can welcome the controversial with impunity, 3 and this
makes them an ideal educational setting. This ideal setting is
fostered by "the very possibility of doing something different
than government can do, of creating an institution free to make
choices government cannot-even seemingly arbitrary ones-
"237without having to provide a justification ... .
This raises a point which should not be missed-the right
to be different includes the right to be wrong. The freedom of
private education is not limited to situations in which the insti-
tution can prove the rightness of its policy; for even when their
policy is arguably wrong, private institutions provide higher
education with a healthy diversity of thought. Indeed, many
private colleges presently exist with rules that may be arbi-
trary, anachronistic and even discriminatory. But the evils of
a private institution's failures cannot begin to equal the prob-
lems created by having a homogeneous educational com-
munity. The American educational system may not suffer if
one private college makes an error, but, "if the federal govern-
ment makes a mistake in its regulations, all 3000 colleges make
the same mistake. There is not one that remains outside the
net to give an example of an institution which took a better
route. The nation is deprived of diversity. .... ,,3
15 The Heald Committee report stated that private schools "give American educa-
tion a diversity and scope not possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they
have an opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, individualistic patterns of thought,
courses of social action, or political or religious activity." O'Neil, Private Universities
and Public Law, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 155, 161 n.24 (1970), quoting from MEErING THE
INCREASING DEMAND FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN NEW YORK STATE: A REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE BOARD OF REGENTs 24 (1960).
11 Forum, Private Universities: The Right to be Different, 11 TULSA L.J. 58, 59
(1975).
Id. at 59, quoting from H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 10 (1969).
' 122 CONG. REc. E3498 (daily ed. June 21, 1976) (memorandum from Dr. Willis
D. Weatherford, Berea College, introduced into the Congressional Record by Rep. Tim
Lee Carter (Ky.)).
[Vol. 65
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C. Constitutional Rights of Private Education
I The importance of the educational pluralism offered by
private institutions has been recognized by the courts begin-
ning with Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.39 In
that landmark case, the United States Supreme Court said
that private institutions "do not fill the place which would
otherwise be occupied by government, but that which would
otherwise remain vacant."4 The case established the right of
private education to remain independent of judicial and gov-
ernmental restraints. Academic freedom as a constitutional
right has seldom been discussed by the courts because histori-
cally it has seldom been intruded upon. 1 The Title IX regula-
tions, however, could force private colleges and universities to
stand firmly on their academic freedoms which are a
"constitutionally protected domain. 42 Private schools are
guaranteed the right to exist without government interference43
as one of the constitutional liberties guaranteed by the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which
have been interpreted to include "the right . . .to acquire
useful knowledge. . . -.1 This interpretation reflects that
"[t]he American people have always regarded education and
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance
which should be diligently promoted."4
In Farrington v. Tokushige,45 a 1927 decision, the Supreme
Court seemed to anticipate the present controversy over affirm-
ative action and the Title IX regulations. At issue was an
Hawaiian statute which gave the Department of Public In-
struction power to regulate and control private schools which
taught the Japanese language.4 7 The statute gave the Depart-
3, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1919).
" Id. at 647.
,1 The principal cases since Dartmouth College which have discussed academic
freedom include: Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Farrington v. Toku-
shige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
42 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
, Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
,S Id. at 400.
" 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
, It should be noted that the Department of Public Instruction set up under the
1977]
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ment control over who could teach and what could be taught.
The Supreme Court decided that this government intrusion
into private schools went too far.
[Tihe school Act and the measures adopted thereunder go
far beyond mere regulation . . . .They give affirmative
direction concerning the intimate and essential details of
such schools, intrust their control to public officers, and deny
both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion in
respect of teachers, curriculum and textbooks." Enforcement
of the Act probably would destroy most, if not all, of them. 9
The Court went on to say that the Act was "[part] of a deliber-
ate plan to bring. . . schools under a strict governmental con-
trol for which the record discloses no adequate reason."5
It is almost prophetic that the Court in 1927 used the
words "affirmative direction"5 to explain the defect in the Act.
Private schools are to be free from governmental intrusion in
the form of "affirmative direction concerning the intimate and
essential details of such schools. 5 2 This same truth is no less
valid today. Schools which lose the freedom to choose their own
teachers and make their own regulations lose the freedom to
provide a unique education. As stated in Griswold v.
Connecticut,5" "The [first amendment] right of freedom of
speech and press includes. . . the freedom of the entire univer-
sity community."5 This freedom includes the right to create a
particular atmosphere on campus which is consistent with the
school's philosophical and moral views. The Supreme Court
has observed that:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and cre-
territorial government is equivalent to a federal agency, and is treated as such with
regard to its rights and powers. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 299 (1927).
,s The criticism most often heard from women's groups concerning the Title IX
regulations has been that "sexist" textbooks and curriculum have not been controlled
therein. 1975 Hearings, supra note 5. HEW's refusal to get involved in regulating
textbooks and curricula is consistent with Farrington.
" Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
50 Id.
5t Id.
52 Id.
381 U.S. 479 (1964).
-" Id. at 482.
[Vol. 65
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ation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the 'four
essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.55
The "four essential freedoms of a university"56 are precisely the
freedoms which affirmative action programs deny to all educa-
tional institutions.
Only HEW can answer whether the Title IX regulations
are "[part] of a deliberate plan to bring . . . schools under a
strict governmental control. ' 57 But whether deliberate or not,
the result is the same; HEW has eroded by indirect means that
which the constitution will not permit by direct means: the
constitutional right of liberty guaranteed to private educa-
tion." The Supreme Court has made it clear that:
[A]cademic freedom . . . [is an area] in which government
should be extremely reticent to tread.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of Ameri-
can universities is almost self-evident. No one should under-
estimate the vital role in a' democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait-jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation."
It may be argued that the Title IX regulations have not
given HEW full control over institutions-that this is really an
insignificant intrusion which should be overlooked because of
the importance of eliminating sex discrimination in higher edu-
cation.10 The Supreme Court, however, is well aware that any
unconstitutional encroachment on academic freedom must be
halted at its inception.
" Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (quoting from The Open
Universities in South Africa 10-12). The Court noted that this approach to education
was poignant because the "plea on behalf of continuing the free spirit of the open
universities of South Africa has gone unheeded." Id. at 262.
" Id.
51 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
" Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
5, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). See also Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) where the Court stated that academic freedom
is so crucial that "this Court will always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress
into this constitutionally protected domain."
11 See note 202, infra for a list of commentators who might take such a position.
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In these matters of the spirit inroads on legitimacy must be
resisted at their incipiency. This kind of evil grows by what
it is allowed to feed on. . . . 'It may be that it is the obnox-
ious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-
ing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight de-
viations from legal modes of procedure.,'
Quietly, but surely, HEW has eroded the decision making pow-
ers of educators and their constitutional right to academic free-
dom. It may be a small step, but HEW has its foot in the door
of academic freedom and it ought not to be there.
II. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE TITLE IX REGULATIONS
The fundamental problem with the HEW regulations is
that they are based on faulty assumptions, both legal and so-
cial. Legally, HEW has assumed that court cases construing
the Title VI racial discrimination regulations can be used to
justify certain provisions of the Title IX regulations. Socially,
HEW has assumed that no differences exist between men and
women. Both assumptions are wrong.
A. Title VI As a Guideline
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was unquestionably
used by HEW as a guideline in the drafting of the Title IX
regulations."2 Furthermore, court decisions dealing with racial
discrimination have consistently been cited by HEW as au-
thority for provisions in the Title IX regulations.13 In particu-
1 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263-64 (1957), partially quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
62 The prelude to the regulations issued at 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975) states: "Title
IX is similar to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) except
that Title IX applies to discrimination based on sex, is limited to education programs
and activities, and includes employment."
11 See 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 486-87. A representative of HEW has stated:
"Since the language of Title IX so closely parallels that of Title VI (relative to racial
discrimination) I believe it to be legally sound that interpretations as to the scope of
coverage with respect to Title IX should also parallel interpretations of Title VI in
similar areas." 121 CONG. REc. S127007 (1975) (letter from Theodore A. Miles, HEW,
to Senator Jesse Helms (Oct. 25, 1975)). See also 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 485,
where Secretary of HEW Weinberger stated: "We tried to find guidance in the most
similar language that we could find in Title VI, which is on the basis of race and not
sex, but it does have, we believe, compelling similarities that required this interpreta-
tion."
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lar, HEW has relied on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch,64
a racial discrimination case, to support its contention that the
government can cut off all federal funds for an institution when
one program is guilty of discrimination. And Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. Johnson5 is cited as conclusive authority for the proposi-
tion that an institution is a recipient of federal funds when the
payee of the federal check is a student. These two cases are
significant not only because of these issues,66 but also because
HEW has used these racial discrimination cases to justify the
Title IX regulations. The legitimacy of this legal maneuver
requires closer scrutiny.
The issue is whether, under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the same standard can be applied
to invalidate classifications based on gender that has been ap-
plied to invalidate classifications based on race. The tradi-
tional standard under the equal protection clause is that laws
which treat one group of people differently from another group
are valid only if there is a rational basis for the differential
treatment. 7 Classifications which are not arbitrary will gener-
ally be upheld68 since the standard includes a presumption in
favor of the reasonableness of the classification. 9 "When the
classification . .. is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the exist-
ence of that state of facts . . . must be assumed."70
This traditional standard does not apply with regard to
classifications based on race, however. When the classification
is based on a suspect criterion7' or when a fundamental right
" 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), affd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir. May 28, 1975).
"See Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rav. 133 [hereinafter cited as
Ultra Vires Challenges], where these two cases and their relationship to Title IX are
reviewed in detail.
11 See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908); and Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
" See generally Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 66.
" Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
7 Id. at 78.
' Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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is encroached upon,72 a stricter test is applied, and the legisla-
ture must show that a compelling state interest is being served
by such a classification. This stricter standard has consistently
been applied to cases of racial discrimination, since race as a
method of classification is identified as a suspect criterion.
3
Thus two standards exist for reviewing whether a classifi-
cation of persons violates the fourteenth amendment. The
rational basis standard is normally applied, while the
compelling state interest or strict scrutiny standard is applied
whenever a suspect criterion was used. The crucial issue, there-
fore, is whether gender is a suspect criterion. If not, then
HEW's use of the Title VI cases to justify the Title IX regula-
tions is on shaky constitutional ground.
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court has never
held gender to be a suspect criterion.7 4 This does not mean that
gender-based classifications are not susceptible to attack under
the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has not been
reluctant to strike down gender-based classifications, but they
have done so on the rational basis standard75 rather than the
compelling state interest standard.
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court could
have declared gender to be a suspect criterion but did not, was
Craig v. Boren,71 where an Oklahoma statute prohibited the
sale of 3.2% beer to males under twenty-one and females under
eighteen. The statute was held to violate the equal protection
clause, but the Court refused to base its holding on the notion
that gender is a suspect classification.7 Instead, the Court re-
lied on Stanton v. Stanton5 and a host of other cases that have
72 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
11 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
" Craig v. Boren, No. 75-628 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 1976); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
71 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
No. 75-628 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 1976).
7 Id. at 8-9.
79 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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refused to make gender a suspect classification. 79
Stanton v. Stanton"0 involved a Utah statute which made
twenty-one the age of majority for males and eighteen the age
of majority for females. The statute was challenged as violating
the equal protection clause, and the Court stated: "We find it
unnecessary in this case to decide whether a classification
based on sex is inherently suspect . . . .Reed, we feel, is con-
trolling here."'
'8
Reed v. Reed,8 the case referred to, involved a provision
of the Idaho probate code which gave an automatic preference
to men over women in applying to be an administrator. For the
first time, a gender based classification was struck down on the
basis of the equal protection clause, 3 but nowhere was a com-
pelling state interest or strict scrutiny test mentioned.84 The
issue was whether a rational relationship existed between the
law's preferential treatment of men and the purpose of the
law. 5 After stating the traditional concept that different
classes of persons may be treated differently under the-four-
teenth amendment, the Court went on to declare:
1, Craig v. Boren, No. 75-628, slip op. at 8-9 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 1976).
Ia 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
' Id. at 13.
92 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
"See generally Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-
1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 617 (1974) for a discussion of the history of sexual classifica-
tions under the equal protection clause before and after Reed.
84 Lower courts also continue to recognize that Stanton and Reed are controlling
cases on the question of whether gender is a suspect criterion. Moss v. Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, 408 F. Supp. 403, 409 (M.D. Fla. 1976) directly con-
fronted the question of which standard was proper and held that:
The only Supreme Court authority for Plaintiff's conclusion [that
"compelling state interest" is the proper standard] is a four-justice plurality
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed
2d 583 (1973); and in a later decision [Stanton v. Stanton] a majority of
the Court indicated that they have not as yet found sex to be a 'suspect' basis
for legislative classification.
The court went on to say they were "persuaded that [the rational basis standard] is
the proper standard." Id. at 410. The most incredible aspect of the Moss case, however,
is that the Secretary of HEW argued strenuously "that the traditional 'rational basis'
test should be employed." Id. at 409. In light of the Title IX regulations, this is a
strange position for the Secretary to take. It amounts to an admission that the constitu-
tional standard used to determine violation of the equal protection clause is different
for gender and race.
0 404 U.S. at 76.
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The Equal Protection Clause of [the fourteenth] amend-
ment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a stat-
ute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unre-
lated to the objective of that statute. A classification 'must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The question presented by
this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing
applicants . . . bears a rational relationship to a state objec-
tive. 6
Because Reed is the controlling case on this issue, a brief
review of the important cases since Reed is helpful. The only
time that the Supreme Court approached treating sex as an
inherently suspect classification was in Frontiero v.
Richardson.7 Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices,
8
concluded that gender-based classifications are "inherently
suspect and must therefore, be subjected to close judicial scru-
tiny."89 The concurring justices, however, made an effort to
prevent sex from becoming a suspect classification, relying in-
stead on Reed. "It is unnecessary. . . in this case to character-
ize sex as a suspect classification, with all the far-reaching
implications of such a holding. Reed v. Reed, . . . which abun-
dantly supports our decision today, did not add sex to the
narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently
suspect.""
"Subsequent to Frontiero, the Court has declined to hold
that sex is a suspect class.""1 Kahn v. Shevin92 involved a Flor-
ida statute which allowed a $500 property tax exemption to
widows, but refused the same exemption to widowers. The
Court relied on Reed to validate the law, stating that the sex-
" Id. at 75-76.
97 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Douglas, J., White, J., Marshall, J.
411 U.S. at 682.
10 Id. at 691-92. (Powell, J., Blackman, J., Burger, J., concurring).
" Craig v. Boren, No. 75-628, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 1976) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
92 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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based classification had a "fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation."93 No mention was made of sex as a
suspect criterion. 4 In Geduldig v. Aiello,95 a California tempo-
rary disability insurance program which excluded normal preg-
nancies from its coverage, was challenged on equal protection
grounds. In a landmark decision, the Court stated clearly that
pregnancy classifications do not violate the equal protection
clause.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification. . . . Absent a show-
ing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitution-
ally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage
of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis."
Thus the Court again refused the compelling state interest test
while affirming the legitimacy of normal pregnancy classifica-
tions. 7
Immediately preceding Stanton in the line of Supreme
Court cases was Schlesinger v. Ballard,9" in which a naval offi-
cer challenged a law requiring mandatory discharge of male
officers for failure to receive certain promotions within ten
years. Similarly situated female officers were discharged only
after thirteen years. In holding for the defendant, the Court
used the rational basis test.9
It is significant that the Court has realized that gender-
, Id. at 352.
" Dissenters in the case did, however, note the continuing belief of a plurality of
the Court that "gender-based classifications are suspect." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
at 361 (White, J., dissenting) and 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
" Id. at 496.
" Brennan, J., again dissents, claiming that Reed and Frontiero "mandate a
stricter standard of scrutiny which the State's classification fails to satisfy." Id. at 498
(dissenting opinion).
, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
" Again, Brennan, J., dissents. He has been consistent in the gender-based cases
in holding that gender is a "suspect classification [that] can be sustained only if the
Government demonstrates that the classification serves compelling interests that can-
not be otherwise achieved." Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) (dissenting
opinion).
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based classifications can violate the equal protection clause.
But it is equally significant, for purposes of analyzing the Title
IX regulations, that such classifications were analyzed in terms
of the rational basis test, not the strict scrutiny test which
applies to racial classifications. The different constitutional
standards for race and gender make HEW's use of the Title VI
cases to explain Title IX regulations highly questionable.
HEW explains its positions with an argument that seems
logical at first glance.' 0 Secretary Weinberger states that HEW
did give the sex discrimination cases serious consideration
when drafting the regulations.' 1 The position of HEW is that
those cases "deal with sex discrimination under the
[fourteenth] Amendment and not sex discrimination under a
,00 For an explanation of HEW's position, see 1975 Hearings, supra note 5 at 486-
87 (letter from Secretary Weinberger to Sub-committee Chairman O'Hara (July 2,
1975)).
M Id. at 477. This is particularly odd in view of the fact that on June 26, 1975,
during the sex discrimination regulations hearings, the Secretary expressed his opinion
that the question of whether sex is a suspect criterion had never been presented to the
Supreme Court. Obviously, he was mistaken. The following dialogue indicates the
confusion that existed at HEW during those days:
REP. QUIE: I gather, Mr. Secretary, from your testimony, and it has
been suggested by other witnesses that have appeared before us, that title
IX should be administered in a manner identical to the enforcement proce-
dures under title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet identified sex as a suspect
class under the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Wouldn't
this indicate to you that legally title IX cannot be enforced by the same full
force and effect as title VI of the Civil Rights Act?
SECRETARY WEINBERGER: I don't quite get the import of your question,
Congressman. Are you asking me to predict what the Supreme Court would
say?
REp. QUIE: No, no . ..I imagine when you enforce the law you also
take into consideration the law as it has been interpreted in light of court
decisions. The court has defined race as a suspect class, but they have not
done that with sex. Evidently, the court feels that under the Constitution
there is a difference between individuals on the basis of sex and not a differ-
ence on the basis of race.
SECRETARY WEINBERGER: I suggest the only reason they have not is the
question has not been presented to them yet. I am not aware of any specific
holding by the court that sex is not a basis for protecting or for special
categorization by Congress. I am not aware of any adverse ruling.
I suspect that the reason that there has not been a ruling is it simply
has not yet been presented . . ..
REP. QuIE: Well, I will send you some of the cases like Reed v. Reed
1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 477.
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specific act of Congress. When Congress specifically prohibits
certain discrimination by statute, a higher standard may well
apply than under the [fourteenth] Amendment.' ' 2 In partic-
ular, HEW cites cases"°3 which were decided under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Acts of 19641'0 concerning sex discrimination
in employment. The cases under Title VII consistently held
that a higher standard applies in reviewing sex classifications
under Title VII than under Reed, Geduldig, and the fourteenth
amendment. °5 The two standards were explained in Satty v.
Nashville Gas Co. :106 "Under the Equal Protection Clause there
need be only a 'reasonable basis' for the legislative determina-
tion. However, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there must
be an actual business necessity for employment policies that
discriminate on the basis of sex."'' 7 So HEW has argued that
under Title IX, a higher standard comparable to the Title VII
standard should be applicable, and that this somehow justifies
their use of Title VI cases to explain their regulations. They
reasoned that: "Although there are no cases specifically dealing
with the effect of Geduldig or any of the other Supreme Court
decisions cited above on Title IX, the reasoning involved in the
Title VII cases is equally applicable to Title IX."''0 °
HEW's argument, however, has been damaged by the re-
cent Supreme Court case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,'9
which has in effect overruled every case relied on by HEW."10
,o, Id. at 487.
"° Cases cited by HEW were Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd
Cir. 1975); Communication Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
513 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 10 FEP Cases 73 (6th Cir. 1975); Vineyard v.
Hollister School Dist., 8 FEP Cases 1009 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
01 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970). The enforcing agency for Title VII is the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
,05 See Communication Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Tyler v Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School
Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1975); Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975). See
Section hA supra for a discussion of Reed and Geduldig.
, 384 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975).
,07 384 F. Supp. at 770.
"' 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 487.
,' No. 74-1589 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 1976).
110 See note 88 supra for the cases relied upon by HEW.
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The facts of Gilbert are similar to Geduldig: the issue was
whether the General Electric Company must include normal
pregnancies within the coverage of its temporary disability in-
surance program. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
that Geduldig was not controlling since there is a "difference
of approach in applying constitutional standards under the
Equal Protection Clause, as in [Geduldig], and in the statu-
tory construction of the 'sex-blind' mandate of Title VII.""' In
effect, the lower court applied a higher standard to Title VII
discrimination than would be applied under the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision,
reversed the lower court and held that equal protection cases
such as Geduldig"2 are relevant in interpreting acts of Con-
gress, including Title IX.
[T]he similarities between the congressional language and
some of [the equal protection] decisions surely indicates
[sic] that the latter are a useful starting point in interpreting
the former .... We think, therefore, that our decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello, dealing with a strikingly similar disability
plan, is quite relevant in determining whether or not the
pregnancy exclusion did discriminate on the basis of sex.
• ..The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in con-
cluding that the reasoning of Geduldig was not applicable to
an action under Title VII."
3
The Court noted that "Geduldig is precisely in point,"" 4 and
held that the insurance program which excluded pregnancy
from its coverage was valid.
The Supreme Court has therefore put to rest the idea that
classifications under acts of Congress are judged under a higher
standard than those under the equal protection clause. In light
of the Gilbert case, HEW's use of the Title VII cases to argue
that Title VI provides a proper framework for viewing Title IX
is unsupportable.
The position of the Gilbert Court is fully consistent with
'" Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975).
112 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
113 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, No. 74-1589, slip op. at 7, 9-10 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec.
7, 1976).
"I Id. at 10.
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another factor in the analysis, which is that the legislation
involving race and sex is not identical and therefore cannot be
applied identically. The express language of Title VI (racial
discrimination), Title VII (sex and race discrimination in em-
ployment), and Title IX (sex discrimination in education) indi-
cates clearly that Congress did not intend for each act to be
enforced with equal standards.
Title VI contains no exceptions." 5 Title VII contains sev-
eral exceptions, including employment of aliens,"' employ-
ment for religious and educational activities,"7 and employ-
ment where sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification.""8
Title IX also lists numerous exceptions, including private un-
dergraduate school admissions,"' religious schools,' 0 military
schools,"' traditionally one-sex schools,'2 2 maintenance of sepa-
rate living facilities for men and women, '23 and other exceptions
added by the HEW regulations.' 24 The statutes seem to follow
the Supreme Court in recognizing that claims of sex discrimi-
nation will be more narrowly defined than claims of racial dis-
crimination.
HEW's argument, therefore, misses the point. Just as race
and gender are on different constitutional footings, they are
also on different statutory footings, as evidenced by the exemp-
tions in Title IX and the conspicuous absence of exemptions in
Title VI. Would HEW permit exceptions within racial discrim-
ination regulations for religious schools, military schools, tradi-
tionally one-race schools, the Boy Scouts, or for separate toilet
facilities for blacks and whites?'2 They would not, and they do
,, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1) (1964).
127 Id.
", 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1964).
" 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1972).
'2 Id. at (a)(3).
2" Id. at (a)(4).
"2 Id. at (5).
,,3 Id. at § 1686.
'" These include bona fide occupational qualifications (45 C.F.R. § 86.61) (1976);
membership practices of sororities, fraternities, Boy Scouts, YMCA, etc. (45 C.F.R. §
86.14) (1976) and access to course offerings (45 C.F.R. § 86.34) (1976).
'- 45 C.F.R. § 86.33 (1976). This inconsistency was also noted by Dr. Dallin H.
Oaks in testimony before the House Subcommittee: "[W]hile Congress prohibits any
segregation on the basis of race, it extended to institutions the right to have separate
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not, because Congress did not write such exceptions into Title
VI. If Congress had wanted Title IX to be enforced under the
same standards as Title VI or even Title VII, then the language
of Title IX would have so indicated. Therefore, HEW's use of
Title VI cases as a rationale for the Title IX regulations should
be carefully reviewed.
B. Inherent Differences
A second faulty assumption of the Title IX regulations is
that no differences exist between men and women. This was
acknowledged by the HEW bureaucrats when they noted the
premise on which Title VI and Title IX are based: "The prem-
ise of both Title VI and Title IX is that there are no inherent
differences or inequalities between the general public and the
persons protected by these statutes, and therefore, there should
be no differential treatment in the administration of federal
programs .. ."I" While it is true there are no inherent in-
equalities between the general public (men) and the persons
protected (women), there are some natural differences between
men and women that might require different rules. Identical
treatment of men and women in the context of protective mea-
sures at dormitories would constitute unequal treatment for
women.'27 Protective measures such as police surveillance and
curfew hours for women, who are more vulnerable to criminal
attack, may have to be abandoned under the Title IX regula-
tions which prohibit "separate treatment."'28 But, the Supreme
Court has recognized that different treatment may be required
for different sexes;' 2' Congress has realized it through their
accommodations for men and women, toilet facilities, locker rooms and shower facili-
ties . . . ." 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 264.
21 41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976). This statement is found in proposed regulations for
handicapped persons issued by HEW. The statement was made in the context of
comparing race or gender discrimination with discrimination against the handicapped.
While HEW noted that handicapped persons might require different treatment to be
equal, they assume that equality for women and men means identical treatment.
I" See Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 982 (1974), which upheld different curfew restrictions for men and women.
'- 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(b)(4) (1976). HEW has indicated that they may not enforce
this section of the regulations, so that in fact, schools may not need to change their
security measures. See note 255 infra.
2' See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);
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Title IX exemptions; 30 and even HEW has indirectly admitted
it through their exemptions.
31
However, the original assumption of HEW, that there are
"no inherent differences between [men] and [women],' 1 32
has led to the incorrect notion that separate treatment always
equals discrimination. Representative John O'Hara discussed
this point in the subcommittee hearings: "[HEW] . . . fell
into the notion, it seems to me, which is appropriate for Title
VI regulations . . that separate is inherently unequal ....
There are in some cases [however], fairly legitimate reasons
why you might want to provide separate but equal facilities
and classes based on sex . . 133 The regulations would be
more practical and effective in preventing sex discrimination
if HEW had recognized from the outset that differences do
exist between men and women and had worked accordingly.
An illustration of the potential for bureaucratic misinter-
pretation existent in the separate treatment provisions of the
Title IX regulations is the recent ruling of HEW concerning
father-son and mother-daughter banquets. On June 25, 1976,
the San Francisco office of HEW sent a letter informing the
Scottsdale, Arizona school district that such school-sponsored
events "would be subjecting students to separate treatment
and would not be permitted by the Title IX regulations." '134
This ruling was met with virtually unanimous outrage in the
press and Congress. Senator Hubert Humphrey called the rul-
ing "distorted at best and, in fact, irresponsible" and stated
that rulings such as this one "bring discredit to serious efforts
to affirm civil rights. 135 Senator Birch Bayh, the original spon-
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See
also Vercheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), which
permitted separate schools for boys and girls where no inequality of opportunity was
disclosed by the record.
"' 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1686 (1972).
"' See 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1976).
232 41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976).
13 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 150.
M' 122 CoNG. REc. S14643 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976) (letter from HEW to Scotts-
dale, Arizona school district, quoted by Senator Paul J. Fannin (Ariz.) on the Senate
floor. HEW informed them that father-son and mother-daughter events violated §
86.31(b)(4) on separate treatment.).
W' 122 CoNG. REc. S14650 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976) (letter from Sen. Hubert H.
Humphrey to Martin H. Gerry, Director of HEW Office of Civil Rights (July 8, 1976)).
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sor of Title IX, was irate: "I tell you, ... , there was no inten-
tion whatsoever to do away with the traditional father-son,
mother-daughter festivities that exist in most of our schools."' 3'
Apparently, Congress was displeased with the bureaucracy
they had intrusted with the responsibility of implementing and
enforcing Title IX.1
3
President Ford was also displeased and "directed [HEW]
to undertake further legal review to determine whether such
application is mandated under the statute.""13 As a result of the
President's directive, HEW suspended all enforcement action
during the review period, '39 leaving open the possibility that
such events could be found to violate the Title IX regulations.
Congress was so disgusted with HEW, however, that they acted
on the matter themselves. Senator Paul Fannin offered an
amendment to Title IX which stated in part: "[T]his section
shall not preclude father-son or mother-daughter activities at
an educational institution, but if such activities are provided
for students of one sex, opportunities for reasonably compara-
ble activities shall be provided for students of the other sex."'4
The bill passed on the floor of the Senate by an 88-0 vote."' It
was a unanimous vote against the narrow definition which the
HEW bureaucrats had applied with regard to separate treat-
ment.
, Id. at S14647.
,ST Besides the father-son controversy, there are other complaints about HEW's
interpretations of Title IX and the separate treatment regulations. Senator Wendell
Ford (Ky.) complained that HEW had informed the "educational people in my State
that the teachers cannot go into the classrooms in the morning and say, 'Good morning,
boys and girls.' This has gone as far as I think it ought to go." 122 CONG. REc. S14650
(daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976). Senator Barry Goldwater was upset because HEW ruled that
schools could not sponsor a boys' choir, since Arizona has one of the most famous boys'
choirs in the world in Tuscon. Id. at S14649. These situations indicate the potential
for abuse of Title IX by over-zealous bureaucrats.
"1 122 CoNG. Rac. S14646 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976) (report of the Department's
Policy Concerning. . . Father-Son, Mother-Daughter Events, Martin H. Gerry, Direc-
tor, Office of Civil Rights).
139 Id.
"I Amendment No. 2155, 122 CONG. REc. S14650 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976). The
full amendment also provided an exemption for the Boy's State and Girl's State
programs of the American Legion. Several senators felt this exemption was unneces-
sary because HEW had already ruled that Boy's State and Girl's State programs fall
within the term "voluntary youth service organization" and are thus exempt from Title
IX coverage. 122 CONG. REc. S14645 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976) (letter from Martin H.
Gerry to Senator Strom Thurmond (Feb. 17, 1976)).
M4 122 CONG. REc. S14652 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976).
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III. SCOPE OF THE TITLE IX REGULATIONS
A. Recipient Institutions
1. The New Definition
Federal regulations, such as those issued for Title IX,
apply only to "recipient institutions," which simply refers to
those institutions which receive federal financial assistance.
Since termination of federal funds is the only effective method
of enforcement available to the government, the easiest way for
an institution to avoid federal regulation has been to refuse
federal aid. Many educational institutions have traditionally
refused federal financial assistance simply to avoid being clas-
sified as a recipient institution.' Naturally, the decision to
refuse federal aid has placed a severe financial burden on these
independent schools, but they based their refusal on the belief
that the benefits of educational autonomy outweigh the finan-
cial hardships.
Apparently HEW has been frustrated by its inability to
control these autonomous institutions. The Title IX regula-
tions, therefore, contain a revised definition of a recipient insti-
tution so that practically every institution in the United States
now must comply with the regulations, including those schools
which have always refused federal aid.' The sacrifices many
private institutions made for decades to avoid federal control
become meaningless now as HEW has in effect changed the
rules of the game while the game is in progress.
Sections 86.2(g) and (h) contain the controversial defini-
tion of recipient.' As enforced by HEW, they state that an
"2 The American Assoc. of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities,
whose membership is representative of all private institutions, has reported the follow-
ing figures on their members:
Receive no federal aid directly: 26%.
Receive assistance amounting to less than 2% of their annual budget: 29%.
Receive assistance amounting to more than 2% but less than 10% of their
annual budget: 29%.
Receive assistance amounting to more than 10% of their annual budget: 15%.
AAPICU RPPor, supra note 26, Sept. 1976, at 2.
143 Id. The AAPICU REPORT states that two members of AAPICU will neither
receive federal aid nor enroll students who are receiving any kind of federal assistance.
These two would be the only schools in the United States that would not be classified
as "recipients." Id.
"' The pertinent sections state:
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institution is a recipient of federal aid when a student at the
institution accepts financial assistance from the government,
such as veteran's educational benefits or a federally issued
loan."' If a school enrolls one student who receives any finan-
cial aid from the federal government, that school is a recipient
just as a school which receives millions of dollars in direct
federal grants is a recipient. This is a new approach for HEW.
As recently as 1974, HEW stated that: "[T]he statute does not
apply to an educational institution solely because the students
attending the institution receive benefits under a federal pro-
gram. The test is whether the institution itself is receiving the
funds." ' This is the position which federal agencies have tra-
ditionally taken until the Title IX regulations.
The response of private institutions which have tradition-
ally refused federal aid has been outrage. The charge has been
led by Hillsdale College in Hillsdale, Michigan, but the criti-
cism over this new definition of recipient has also been wide-
spread among legislators'47 and the news media.4 8 Hillsdale
(g) "Federal financial assistance" means any of the following, when author-
ized or extended under a law administered by the Department:
(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made
available for:
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity
for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended
directly to such students for payment to that entity.
(h) "Recipient" means any State or political subdivision thereof, any pub-
lic or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any
person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through
another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which
receives or benefits from such assistance, including any subunit, successor,
assignee, or transferee thereof.
45 C.F.R. §§ 86.2(g)(1)(ii) and (h) (1975) (emphasis added).
145 This is clearly HEW's interpretation of §§ 86.2(g) and (h), as evidenced by
letters to newly designated recipient institutions like Hillsdale College, and the com-
ments which accompanied the regulations at 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
"I Letter from Arlena Renders, Assistant Regional Attorney for HEW to Dr. Gene
Habecker, Dean of Students, George Fox College (March 16, 1976), reprinted in 122
CONG. REc. S14,678 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976). (The statute referred to was the Family
Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974, popularly known as the Buckley Amend-
ment.)
"I See, e.g., 121 CONG. Rxc. S12,010 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (memorandum of Sen.
Helms); 121 CONG. Rc. E6,798 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975) (statement of Rep. Crane);
S.390 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 122 CONG. Rtc. S14,760-17,764 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1976)
(Amendment no. 390, submitted by Sen. McClure, stating that: "[Flederal financial
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College is one of the minority of private institutions which has
traditionally refused all federal aid. When it became obvious
that the new definition of recipient included Hillsdale, the
Board of Trustees responded with a resolution which affirmed
their intention to maintain independence, even if it meant a
direct confrontation with HEW:
WHEREAS, by the [Title IX] regulations, the Federal gov-
ernment now seeks to impose its control over [our] freedom
and independence through the subterfuge that a few of the
students at Hillsdale College receive federal aid through the
medium of such programs as Veterans Benefits and the Na-
tional Direct Student Loan Fund; ....
...RESOLVED, that Hillsdale College will, to the extent
of its meager resources and with the help of God, resist by all
legal means this and all other encroachments on its freedom
and independence."0
Opposition to this new definition has seldom been based
on the reluctance of institutions to treat women equally. For
this reason, Hillsdale College is particularly well-qualified to
lead the fight, since it has maintained an active antidiscrimi-
natory policy since before the Civil War. 5' As President George
Roche of Hillsdale has stated: "The issue at stake is not equal
assistance received means assistance received by the institution directly from the
federal government." The amendment was rejected by a 50-30 vote); S.382 94th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S14,680-81 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976) (Amendment no. 382,
submitted by Sen. Hatfield, which was similar to amendment no. 390, never reached
the floor for a vote. A revised amendment to study the problem was passed, but later
died in a conference committee.)
"I Editorials and other sympathetic articles have appeared in the following:
READERS' DIGEST, May, 1976, at 126; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 1975, at 47; HuMAN EvENTS,
Nov. 22, 1975; Honolulu Star Bulletin, Nov. 5, 1975 at 6, col. A; NATIONAL REVIEW, Dec.
19, 1975 at 1458; Capital City Press, Oct. 30, 1975, at 2, col. a; Wall St. J., Dec. 4,
1975 at 2, col. 1; Chicago Tribune, Nov. 18, 1975, § 2, at 2, col. 1; Von Hoffman, A
Spunky College Won't Back Down, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 22, 1975, § 1, at 12, col. 5
(syndicated column appeared nationwide). These are a few examples of the almost
unanimous support among the media for the stand of Hillsdale College on the issue of
who a "recipient" should be.
' Resolution, Board of Trustees, Hillsdale College (adopted Oct. 10, 1975).
" In 1851, Hillsdale granted the first B.A. degree ever awarded to a woman in
Michigan, and the 39th ever awarded to a woman anywhere. Their present student
body is equally divided between males and females, and 3.5% of the student body is
black, which is a larger black proportion than is found in at least three large, state
universities in Michigan. See Maeroff, Conservative College Fights U.S. Controls, N.Y.
Times, March 19, 1976, at 30, col. 1.
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treatment for minority groups or women. Hillsdale College had
already pioneered in nondiscriminatory treatment for over a
century before the first federal legislation on the subject."1' 5'
The fear is rather that the "entire weight of federal guidelines
• . . would potentially dominate our campus if we once accept
the premise that aid to an individual student makes Hillsdale
College a recipient of federal funds." '152
Perhaps the proper question is whether there is any valid-
ity for these fears. In light of the situation at other private
institutions, where dependence on federal funds has become so
strong that noncompliance would never be considered, the ap-
prehensions appear valid. The fears of federal domination have
become realities in many institutions which are now "hooked
on the Federal dollar.1153 This explains why few of the larger
private institutions with serious objections to affirmative ac-
tion programs have vocalized their objections to HEW. 54
Knowing that "he who pays the piper calls the tune,"'5 5 schools
like Hillsdale simply do not want the federal government call-
ing the tunes on their campus.
2. Legality of The New Definition
To determine the legal propriety of the new definition of
recipient, one must look at the language of Title IX and its
regulations, and the intent of its authors when Congress passed
Title IX.
The relevant language of Title IX provides that: "No per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity
"I Letter from President George Roche to "Friends of Hillsdale" (Oct., 1975).
152 Id.
"I READERS' DIGEST, May, 1976, at 128.
,51 The major disappointment is that few of the larger prestigious private
universities have joined in condemnation of the bureaucratic power play.
The reason apparently is that many are already so heavily dependent on
various forms of government aid that they are in no position to complain.
Unfortunately, that is exactly the point critics of federal aid tried to make
all during those years when a benevolent Washington opened its pocketbook
to swarms of educators and administrators.
Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1975, at 18, col. 1 (emphasis added).
"I NATONAL REvIEw, Dec. 19, 1975, at 1458.
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receiving Federal financial assistance .. ".."156 Apparently
HEW was not satisfied with the language of Title IX, and so
implemented its own language which defines a recipient as one
"to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or
through another recipient and which operates an education
program or activity which receives or benefits from such
assistance . *.... 57 Including the term "benefits from" in the
regulations was a deliberate attempt to expand the scope which
the language of Title IX expresses. "By superadding the
broader, more inclusive term benefits to the language of the
statute, thus permitting inclusion of direct federal aid to stu-
dents in the definition of federal financial assistance, HEW
undoubtedly extended the scope of the statute . ... "I
By ignoring the language of Title IX, HEW has also ig-
nored the plain meaning of the word "recipient."' 59 When a
student receives federal aid, it is the student who receives the
aid, not the college. The student is free to use his loan or grant
at the institution of his choice. The institution chosen by the
student receives money from the student, not the federal gov-
ernment, but HEW insists that such an institution is a recipi-
ent. Dr. Milton Friedman has stated: "[B]y this line of rea-
soning, the comer grocer and the A&P are 'recipient institu-
tions' because some of their customers receive social security
checks. The New York Times and the Chicago Tribune are
Federal contractors because welfare recipients buy papers."'60
Where has HEW derived its authority to make this drastic
change in the definition of recipient? Legally, they have relied
on Bob Jones University v. Johnson,'6 in which a federal dis-
trict court held that a university was a recipient under Title VI
because "payment is made directly to the eligible veteran
under the educational institution."'62 HEW Secretary Wein-
berger stated its reliance on Bob Jones:
"' 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
"' 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
"' Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 66, at 159; see also 1975 Hearings, supra note
5, at 507-08 (memorandum of Sen. Jesse Helms).
15, See 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 508 (memorandum of Sen. Jesse Helms).
i' NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 1975 at 47.
" 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
8,2 Id. at 602.
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As we read Bob Jones, it is not the question of who is the
payee, but it is the question of whether or not there is Federal
assistance furnished. And Federal assistance furnished to a
student who in turn uses it at an institution brings with it the
same results as if you put the money directly to the institu-
tion."3
In Bob Jones, the test set out by the district court was
whether the aid "to veterans assists the educational program
of the approved school." ' 4 The court then found the required
assistance in the fact that "payments to veterans enrolled at
approved schools serve to defray the costs of the educational
program of the schools thereby releasing institutional funds
which would, in the absence of federal assistance, be spent on
the student."'' 5 This is the so-called "benefit theory" under
which HEW contends that money given to one entity within
the university frees money to be used elsewhere, and thus bene-
fits accrue to more than the payee of the federal aid. This
theory is questionable within the context of the several univer-
sity programs."6 It is even less tenable in the student aid situa-
tion where often the institution does not release institutional
funds to spend on the student.'67
The main problem with HEW's reliance on Bob Jones is
that the decision was based upon a gross violation of Title VI, I68
and sex discrimination regulations cannot rely on such cases as
authority.'69 This has been discussed already; the law is that
sex and race discrimination are judged on different constitu-
1' 975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 481.
"' 396 F. Supp. at 603 n.22.
,65 Id. at 602.
,66 See section ITIB supra.
"s It should be noted that just as it is the student who receives aid, not the
institution, it is also the student whose federal aid will be cut off if he attends a school
not in compliance with the federal regulations. The prospective student who is refused
aid is then left with the choice of attending a complying school or not attending school
at all. The practical effect of the new definition therefore is to deprive students of an
education at the institution of their choice. This cut-off of funds to the student will
only occur at private institutions which do not receive federal aid directly since the
federal government has no other method for forcing those institutions to comply with
regulations. Students attending institutions which receive federal money will not face
this threat of losing their money since the federal government can force compliance
by cutting off the institution's funds directly.
6,6 Bob Jones University refused to admit unmarried black students.
," See section IIIB supra.
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tional and statutory grounds. Since race is a suspect criterion,
federal financial assistance has been interpreted broadly under
Title VI to include aid to students. However, where the alleged
sex discrimination does not violate the constitution, the ration-
ale for a broad interpretation of federal financial assistance no
longer exists.'70
The disparity between the Congressional authors' intent
concerning Title VI and Title IX reiterate the impropriety of
using Bob Jones to rationalize the new definition of recipient.
The court there stated that student aid, such as veterans bene-
fits, was intended to be covered by Title VI.17' Title IX's legisla-
tive history, on the other hand, clearly indicates that federal
aid paid directly to students was not intended to be included
as federal financial assistance. Senator Birch Bayh, the author
of Title IX, stated this clearly: "[I]t is unquestionable, in my
judgment, that [termination] would not be directed at spe-
cific assistance that was being received by individual students,
but would be directed at the institution . *"... "I The Sena-
tor's assurance that student aid would not be terminated has
been ignored by the authors of the HEW regulations.'
7 3
Indeed, a student who wants to attend a noncomplying
school risks almost certain termination of his federal loan or
grant. The new definition could force schools which value their
freedom either to turn away students whose only source of fin-
ancial help is the government or raise millions of dollars to
finance the student loans and grants themselves. 174 It is not the
institution which suffers from the system but the student. As
in the grocery store example, Senator Mark 0. Hatfield com-
ments that: "In order to maintain the grocer's independence,
the food stamp recipient suffers. Now, we know that this is not
the case in the administration of the food stamp program. Such
a concept is absurd. But. . . this is precisely what happens in
, See Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 66, at 164.
"' 396 F. Supp. at 603.
12 117 CONG. REc. S30408 (1971).
M' The Bob Jones situation provides a good example since the student was refused
federal money when he insisted on attending Bob Jones University.
"I Hillsdale College President George Roche has stated: "[11f the federal govern-
ment seeks to smash us by cutting off funds to those students who choose to go here,
we'll try to raise the money to finance the students ourselves." READERS' DIGEST, May,
1976 at 130.
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higher education."' 7 5 HEW must recognize that it is the stu-
dent who suffers under such a situation; yet no relief is in
sight.'76
The most effective remedy to this problem would be an
amendment to Title IX. Even HEW believes this is the proper
step if they erred in the regulation. Secretary Weinberger told
Congress: "Our view was that student assistance. . . that goes
directly or indirectly to an institution is Government aid within
the meaning of [T]itle IX. If it is not, there is an easy remedy.
Simply tell us it is not. We believe it is.' ' 7 Congress could have
precluded this problem had they told HEW after the 1975
Hearings on the regulations to take sections 86.2(g) and (h)
back to the drawing board and try again.'7 8 Since then, Con-
"' 122 CONG. REc. S14,678 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976).
,1, At least part of the problem with this definition of a recipient is that HEW
realizes the preposterous result of the definition, but rather than face this fact and
amend the regulations, they persist in their interpretation. They realize that the end
result of the definition is that individual students, not institutions, will have much-
Deeded financial assistance terminated, but they are hesitant to admit it and amend
the regulations accordingly. The comments of Secretary Weinberger in response to a
question at the 1975 congressional hearings clearly indicate the attempt to justify the
definition of a recipient without facing the reality of its result.
REp. Qum: Let me ask you then, if an institution comes under your jurisdic-
tion, because of the fact that student assistance was made available to a
student attending that institution and that institution discriminating, would
you then have the authority to sanction the cutting off of student assistance
aid to students in that institution?
SEC. WE BNERGER: I think you have to look at the particular statute in-
volved. If you are talking about title IX and the conclusion is that student
assistance brings the institution at which it is used under the general author-
ity of the regulations, then I think the Federal financial assistance to that
institution might well be cut off. I don't think you would take the . ..
assistance away from the student who was denied admission, . . . but you
would let him take it and use it somewhere where there was not a violation
... .We would certainly not take enforcement action against an innocent
student.
1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 481-82 (emphasis added). The Secretary admits that
innocent students should not be penalized, but in fact, this is precisely what happens.
They must either take their grant to a school which they may not care to attend, or
have the grant terminated.
'" 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 484.
ITs The authority for the hearings on HEW's sex discrimination regulations was
established by § 431(d) of the General Education Provision Act, which requires all
regulations published in the Federal Register to be transmitted to Congress, which
then is given 45 days to review the regulations. By passage of a concurrent resolution,
the Congress can refuse the regulations, and the drafting agency (HEW) must issue
modified regulations. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (Supp. 1974). Several members of Congress
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gress again failed to act when in August 1976, the Senate re-
jected amendments by Senators Hatfield and McClure which
would have precluded HEW from defining school as a recipient
when only students received aid.Y9 The only action taken by
Congress has been an authorization for the General Accounting
Office to conduct a study of the problem, 8 ' but even this fall-
back amendment was not retained in the conference commit-
tee.'"' Only an amendment by Congress will fully correct the
problem.
B. Institutional Approach of HEW
Controversial issues abound in the Title IX regulations,
and one of the most controversial has been whether HEW sur-
introduced concurrent resolutions, including: Sen. Helms, S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S9,713-15 (daily ed. June 5, 1975); Sen. Laxalt, S. Con. Res.
52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S12,695-96 (daily ed. July 16, 1975); Rep.
Martin, H. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H5,636 (daily ed. June
17, 1975).
"I Senator Hatfield proposed that:
[T]he Federal government may not (1) withhold Federal funds, or (2) rega-
late the practices of educational institutions receiving Federal funds...
where such power to withhold or regulate is based upon the receipt of Federal
financial assistance when such assistance is limited to. . . funds extended
to an institution for payment to or on behalf of students or extended to
students for payment of education-related expenses ....
S.382, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 122 CONG. Rxc. S14,677 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976). This
version of the amendment never made it to the floor for a vote, as Senator Pell and
Senator Javits rejected it. 122 CONG. REc. S14,680 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976). Senator
McClure's amendment stated: "For purposes of this chapter, federal financial assist-
nace received means assistance received by the institution directly from the federal
government." S.390, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S14,760 (daily ed. Aug. 27,
1976). The Senate rejected the amendment by a vote of 30-50.
I" Amendment No. 382 was proposed by Senator Hatfield in this form after its
original form was rejected:
The G.A.O. is herein directed to conduct a detailed analysis of the extent
and effects of the Federal government's regulations of educational institu-
tions where such regulation is based solely upon the presence at those institu-
tions of students participating in Federal student assistance programs. . ..
This study shall continue for a period of not more than nine months at the
end of which the G.A.O. shall file a complete report of its findings with the
Labor and Public Welfare Committee of the U.S. Senate and the Education
and Labor Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.
S.382, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S14,681 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1976).
"I' Memorandum from Senator Mark Hatfield's staff to the author (Nov. 9, 1976).
Even though this amendment was killed in the conference committee, Sen. Hatfield
intends to initiate a joint request to the General Accounting Office to study the prob-
lem.
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passed the intent of Congress in extending the scope of the
regulations to an entire institution, even though only one pro-
gram within the institution may be receiving federal funds.
8 2
The language of Title IX expressly states that it applies only
to an "education program or activity."'8 3 Congress further di-
rected HEW "to effectuate the provisions of Section 1681 of
this title with respect to such program or activity."'8 4 The scope
of Title IX's coverage therefore has been expressly limited by
Congress to programs or activities receiving federal financial
aid. HEW's regulations, however, are not so limited. Rather
than extending only to programs receiving federal aid, they
extend to an entire educational institution. The regulations
define their own scope, stating that they "[apply] to every
recipient and to each education program or activity operated
by such recipient which receives or benefits from federal finan-
cial assistance."'8 15 HEW Secretary Weinberger interprets this
to mean that "the final regulation applies to all aspects of all
educational programs or activities of a school district, institu-
tion of higher education, or other entity which receives federal
funds for any of those programs.""18
The regulations have unquestionably expanded the scope
of Title IX by the inclusion of the words "benefits from," words
not found in Title IX. How does HEW justify such an
expansion? HEW's rationale is again based on the benefit
theory-which presumes that "[f]ederal assistance received
by one program benefits all other programs within the institu-
tion"'8 by "releasing" institutional funds. HEW assumes that
even programs receiving no federal aid are benefitting from aid
given to another program. It is much the same rationale used
to designate a school as a recipient when only students receive
aid.
Curiously, HEW relies on Board of Public Instruction v.
" 45 C.F.R. § 86.11 (1976). The regulation was interpreted by Secretary Wein-
berger in the congressional hearings. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 438.
' 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. 1974).
m 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1970).
'' 45 C.F.R. § 86.11 (1976).
,8 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 438 (emphasis added).
Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 66, at 182. This Comment discusses in detail
the entire problem of institutional versus programmatic application of Title IX at 169-
84.
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Finch18 1 to support its position, stating that the HEW
"interpretation is consistent with the only case specifically rul-
ing on the language contained in Title VI, which holds that
Federal funds may be terminated under Title VI upon a finding
that they 'are infected by a discriminatory environment'
... "I" While the reliance of HEW on Finch is questionable
on many grounds, 9" the most important problem is that HEW
is relying on "a rank distortion of what the court in fact said.''9
It is strange that HEW would rely on Finch for its authority,
since this case fully supports the position that only programs
which receive federal assistance directly are subject to HEW
guidelines. The court in Finch was interpreting section 602 of
Title VI, which is practically identical to section 902 of Title
IX. Section 602 establishes that "termination [of federal
funds] . . .shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro-
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been
so found." ' HEW attempted to terminate funds for an entire
school district in Florida when only particular schools and pro-
grams had violated the HEW regulations. The court refused to
give a broad interpretation to the statute, and held that under
Title VI "[t]he [termination] action of HEW in the proceed-
ings below was clearly disruptive of the legislative scheme.' ' 93
Instead, "termination of funds under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act must be made on a program by program basis
... ,9. The court stated that HEW could not, under Title
VI, terminate funds to an entire institution because one pro-
gram failed to comply. In light of the stricter standard applied
to racial discrimination than sex discrimination, 191 this holding
has even more validity for the Title IX regulations.
,U 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
IR 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975), quoting partially from Board of Pub. Instruction v.
Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
IN Ultra Vires Challenge, supra note 66, at 172-79, discusses Finch and HEW's
reliance on it more fully.
"1 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 99 (testimony of John A. Fusak, Pres., NCAA).
112 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (Section 602, Title VI) (1964), as quoted in Board of Pub.
Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1969).
", Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1075 (5th Cir. 1969).
H Id. at 1078-79.
", See section II supra.
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Congress did not intend that such a program suffer for the
sins of others. HEW was denied the right to condemn pro-
grams by association. The statute prescribes a policy of disas-
sociation of programs in the fact finding process. Each must
be considered on its own merits to determine whether or not
it is in compliance with the Act. In this way the Act is
shielded from a vindictive application. Schools and programs
are not condemned en masse or in gross, with the good and
the bad condemned together, but the termination power
reaches only those programs which would utilize federal
money for unconstitutional ends. Under this procedure each
program receives its own "day in court."96
In the preface to the Title IX regulations issued on June
4, 1975, HEW claimed that Finch "holds that federal funds
may be terminated under Title VI upon a finding that they
[the institutions] 'are infected by a discriminatory environ-
ment'." '97 Either HEW's legal staff does not appreciate the
difference between a holding and dictum, or HEW is being
deliberately misleading, because the language referred to by
the Department is purely dicta, not the holding. The court left
open the possibility that HEW, in evaluating compliance.on a
"program by program basis," need not consider each program
"in isolation from its context." '98 Yet in the Finch case, it was
decided that the programs in compliance had not been
"infected by a discriminatory environment," even though some
of the schools in the district were openly practicing racial segre-
gation in violation of the Title VI regulations. One commenta-
tor noted during the 1975 congressional sex discrimination
hearings that HEW had not really relied upon the holding of
Finch, but instead ignored it.
The [Finch] "infection" dicta. . . have been used by HEW
to obscure the holdings of that case. It is useful initially to
note that HEW lost the Taylor County case, despite the fact
that the plaintiff was a segregated school district. If HEW's
present use of the infection dicta were in fact supported by
the case, they would have won it.'"
"I Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969) (empha-
sis added).
" 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
"' Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969).
,' 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 404 (testimony of Janet L. Kuhn, Attorney).
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One last point concerning the Finch case and the benefit
theory deserves brief mention. The primary assumption behind
HEW's benefit theory is that discrimination in one program
automatically infects all other programs, or conversely, that
federal funds sent to one program automatically benefit all
other programs. Finch attacked this assumption:
In order to affirm HEW's action, we would have to assume,
contrary to the express mandate of the statute that defects
in one part of a school system automatically infect the whole.
Such an assumption in disregard to [sic] statutory require-
ments is inconsistent with both fundamental justice and
without judicial responsibility. °0
If HEW is forbidden from presuming infection of an entire
institution, it must also be prohibited from presuming that
benefits are conferred upon an entire institution when one of
its programs or students receives federal financial aid. As one
commentator has stated: "If HEW cannot presume that dis-
crimination in one program taints all programs. . ., it is diffi-
cult to imagine how the Department could be justified in using
that presumption to expand the scope of its regulatory pow-
ers." 20
1
What caused HEW to misinterpret the Finch case and
neglect the plain language of Title IX? °2 It is probable that
HEW, in its belief that sex discrimination should be elimi-
nated, felt constricted by the Title IX provisions which limited
21* Id. at 406 (quoting from Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1074
(5th Cir. 1969)).
2,1 Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 66, at 175.
"I It should be noted in fairness to HEW that their position on this question has
been supported by some commentators. See Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX L. REv. 103
(1974), which stated that Finch, along with McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp.
498 (D.N.M. 1970) and Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972), "appear
to support the proposition that if a program is neither directly receiving federal money
nor directly discriminating, it can escape the grasp of Title IX." Id. at 110. Despite
this appraisal, the author used the benefit theory to agree with HEW's position. See
also 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 171 (statement of Birch Bayh, U.S. Sen. from
Indiana), 385-86 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler, Director, Project on the Status and
Education of Women, and Executive Association of American Colleges, Wash., D.C.),
416, 420 (statements of Nellie M. Varner, Director, Affirmative Action, and Assis. Prof.
of Political Science, U. of Mich., appearing on behalf of the National Assoc. of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, The American Council on Education, and the
Assoc. of American Universities).
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enforcement to "programs or activities" receiving federal assis-
tance.2°3 HEW feared that, "if interpreted narrowly, the provi-
sions could become a stumbling block on the path to full imple-
mentation of the policy underlying Title IX."04 Congress had
deliberately limited the scope of Title IX 215 so HEW decided
to circumvent the limitation. In desperate need of authority,
HEW adopted the dictum in the Finch case and interpreted it
as a holding. In the absence of stronger authority, HEW cannot
ignore the express language of Title IX, which applies to feder-
ally funded programs, not institutions.
C. Religious Exemption
Many of the issues raised by the Title IX regulations have
religious and moral significance because the questions concern
sexual morality and the sexual role of individuals in society.
HEW recognized that these questions are basically religious by
including section 86.12 in the regulations. This section exempts
all educational institutions which are controlled by a religious
organization to the extent that provisions of the regulations
conflict with a specific tenet of the religious organization."'
2- 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1682 (1972).
2014 Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimi-
nation in Public Schools, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 103, 108 (1974). This statement is from a
law review article which viewed the HEW interpretation of Finch favorably.
20 Three educational sex discrimination laws were introduced in Congress. Sena-
tor Birch Bayh's original Title IX amendment, S.398-659, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 117
CONG. REc. 30156-57 (1971) and President Nixon's bill, H.R. 5191, 92nd Cong., 1st
Sess., 117 CONG. Rlc. 4371 (1971), would have given HEW enforcement powers over
institutions, not programs. The bill adopted by Congress, sponsored by Rep. Edith
Green, H.R. 7248, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. Rc. 39354-74 (1971), limited the
prohibition on sex discrimination to "education program or activity." Congress could
have made Title IX applicable to entire institutions, but they did not, as the plain
language of the statute indicates. See Ultra Vires Challenge, supra note 66, at 169-70.
20 The section reads as follows:
Educational institutions controlled by religious organizations
a) Application. This part does not apply to an educational institution
which is controlled by a religious organization to the extent application of
this part would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organiza-
tion.
b) Exemption. An educational institution which wishes to claim the ex-
emption set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, shall do so by submitting
in writing to the Director a statement by the highest ranking official of the
institution, identifying the provisions of this part which conflict with a spe-
cific tenet of the religious organization.
45 C.F.R. § 86.12 (1976).
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The exemption, therefore, applies only to schools which can
meet a two-prong test. Section 86.12 requires that: 1) The insti-
tution must be controlled by a religious organization; and 2)
some part of the regulations must conflict with a specific tenet
of the religious organization, with HEW being the final arbiter
of whether a conflict exists. The exemption then exists only for
those parts of the regulations which are in conflict with the
specific tenet.
While HEW should be lauded for including this religious
exemption, two serious problems exist with the section. First,
a constitutional question is presented by the portion of section
86.12 which requires the schools to submit a statement of their
conflict, and then allows HEW to determine whether the con-
flict between the regulations and the specific tenet is genuine.
The regulations place the burden of proving religious sincerity
on the institution by requiring a statement in writing from the
school president identifying the provisions of the regulations
which "conflict with a specific tenet of the religious organiza-
tion."2 7 HEW then decides whether the application for an ex-
emption is valid."8 Brigham Young University's President,
Dallin H. Oaks, stated the viewpoint of religious institutions:
[A] government agency reserves the right to judge the con-
tent and application of a religious tenet, and presumably, to
deny an institution's assertion that its religious belief com-
pels a certain action or teaching.
By this means government and not the church becomes
the final arbiter of religious worship, practice, and belief.0 9
HEW says its responsibility is to assure that the institutions
claiming exemptions have a full understanding of the provi-
sions from which they believe themselves exempt.2 1° HEW
therefore will not say explicitly that it is reviewing the contents
m Id. at (b).
" It should be noted here that, according to HEW, only two or three schools have
received the religious exemption. This is because HEW considers review of religious
exemption applications to be a "low priority." Telephone conversation with Al Ham-
lin, HEW, Office of Civil Rights (Nov. 10, 1976).
2" 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 228, 251 (testimony of Dallin H. Oaks, President
of Brigham Young University, Director and Secretary of the American Association of
Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities).
21, Letter from Martin H. Gerry, Acting Director, Office for Civil Rights, to Pres.
Dallin H. Oaks of Brigham Young University (March 17, 1976).
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of a religious tenet, but it seems apparent from a straightfor-
ward reading of section 86.12(b) that HEW must do so in order
to process a school's application for exemption.
In reserving the right to judge the sincerity of the school's
beliefs, HEW has violated the first amendment rights of all
schools making such an application.2 1' The courts have consis-
tently stated that the federal government and its agencies are
severely limited by the first amendment, 2 1  and more impor-
tantly that no one shall ever have to prove the verity of his
religious beliefs. In United States v. Ballard, 21  the Supreme
Court stated the law that is now "well settled":
214
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Reli-
gious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
211 In this context, the first amendment freedoms are absolute. They can be pro-
perly restricted only when a sufficiently important governmental interest appears.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967). The Supreme Court has stated this
concept: "[Ihe 1st Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940). The Court then went on to say that "the
power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly
to infringe the protected freedom." Id. at 304 (emphasis added). In West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) the Court stated:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
include, so. far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of
the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting.
But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not
be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect.
Id. at 639 (emphasis added). See also Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In the present context, § 86.12 would be consti-
tutionally permissible only if a "grave and immediate danger" existed within the
religious schools in question.
"I Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497,
501 (1st Cir. 1950) states that: the "[First] Amendment limits only the action of
Congress or of agencies of the federal government . . . ." Mcntire v. William Penn
Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 601 (3rd Cir. 1945) states that: "[Tihe First Amend-
ment was intended to operate as a limitation to the actions of Congress and of the
federal government." See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Fellowship
of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. 1957); Delaware Trust Co. v.
Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383 (Del. 1943); Zlotoxitz v. Jewish Hosp., 84 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1948).
213 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
2,, Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (Cal. 1957);
see also Estate of Supple v. Hallihan, 55 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1967).
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incomprehensible to others. . . .The Fathers of the Consti-
tution . . . fashioned a charter of government which envis-
aged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's
relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was
granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to
no man for the verity of his religious views." 5
It is clear that HEW is not constitutionally permitted to
force institutions to explain their religious views and then sub-
ject those views to governmental scrutiny. "[T]he State has
no power to decide the validity of the beliefs held by the group
involved." ' If the government does apply a test of some sort
to determine whether the school's application for a religious
exemption is valid, it must be an objective one, and "[o]nce
the validity or content of the belief is considered, the test be-
comes subjective and invalid.
217
The second problem with section 86.12 is more important
for traditionally Christian schools which have no direct affilia-
tion with a church or religious organization. The regulations
make it clear that the exemption exists only for "an educa-
tional institution which is controlled by a religious organiza-
tion. ,,21 Thus Christian schools which have no affiliation with
a larger organization or church 211 automatically fail the test set
forth by HEW. 20 This narrow application of the religious ex-
25 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (emphasis added).
21, Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
217 Id.
21" 45 C.F.R. § 86.12(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
2' HEW has never really defined which institutions are "controlled by a religious
organization." As a general rule however, only the schools which are actually within
the organizational structure of the church will meet the definition. For example,
Brigham Young University, which is an integral part of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, has been given an exemption. Letter from Martin H. Gerry, Acting
Director, Office for Civil Rights to President Dallin H. Oaks of Brigham Young Univer-
sity (Aug. 12, 1976). On the other hand, Asbury College in Wilmore, Kentucky is
unquestionably a religious institution, yet they have no direct affiliation with any
church. They fail to meet the definition. Thus, affiliation with a larger church organi-
zation seems to be the key. Interview with Dr. Dennis F. Kinlaw, Pres. of Asbury
College (Sept. 26, 1976).
22 It is interesting to note at this point that a direct conflict exists between the
language of § 86.12 and the language of an HEW memorandum which was issued to
explain the regulations. Senator Bellman put the memorandum, which was in question
and answer form, into the Congressional Record at 121 CONG. REc. S13460 (1975),
because he believed that it "accurately answers the most frequently asked questions."
It states in part:
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emption forces many Christian schools to comply with parts of
the regulations which violate moral standards of conduct and
belief held by the schools.2 2' The exclusion of these schools from
the religious exemption is unfair at best and a violation of their
first amendment right to freedom of religion at worst.
A constitutional question is again raised by HEW's inter-
pretation of who qualifies to be exempt. Under section 86.12(a),
the sincerity of an institution's beliefs are judged by whether
the institution is controlled by a religious organization. An in-
stitution not "controlled by a religious organization" is not
religious enough to qualify, according to HEW. This criterion
for judgment is not only severely limiting, but the criterion and
the judgment itself violate the first amendment rights to free-
dom of religion which are guaranteed to the many Christian
colleges in America which have no affiliation with a larger
church or organization. The courts have upheld this right by
stating that "even an unorganized religious body or sect . . .
is guaranteed the same degree of freedom in religious worship
as is assured the larger denominations." ' The first amend-
ment was not intended to protect only religious groups asso-
ciated with some large "organization," or even only "orthodox"
religions. 23 "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
Q. Who is exempt from Title IX's provisions?
A. Religious schools to the extent that the provisions of Title IX would be
inconsistent with the basic religious tenets of the school.
The question was not answered "accurately." Under this answer, all religious schools,
including those without affiliation with a religious organization or church would seem
to be included. Either HEW intended to include such institutions within the religious
exemption and simply misworded § 86.12(a) so as to exclude them, or this memoran-
dum is an example of deliberately inaccurate public relations, issued with the intent
of giving the impression that the religious exemption is broad.
2'1 Letter from Dr. Dennis F. Kinlaw, President of Asbury College in Wilmore,
Kentucky, to alumni (July 7, 1976), stating the position in which such schools have
been left:
It is not legal to seek to present models of chastity and marital fidelity. We
may not inquire about the marital status of prospective employees. We are
to treat pregnancy out of marriage as any other "temporary disability". And
abortion must be handled similarly. We can no longer claim to be non-
discriminatory if we take cognizance in our social life that there are differ-
ences between men and women.
"I O'Neill v. Hubbard, 40 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (1943). This court was interpreting
art. 1, § 3 of the New York State Constitution which is similar to the first amendment
of the United States Constitution in that it guarantees religious freedom.
"I See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
[Vol. 65
TITLE IX REGULATIONS
stellation, it is that no official high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, [or] religion
. . " 4 These distinguished words from the Supreme Court
convey the notion that the rights of a small, private religious
college with no affiliation with a large organized church are just
as strongly protected by the first amendment as are the rights
of a school with a direct affiliation with some church. There-
fore, the Department of HEW made an error of constitutional
significance when it excluded such schools from the potential
exemption available in section 86.12.
At a time when most Americans want a return to an educa-
tion that teaches moral and ethical development as part of the
curriculum,2 5 it is significant that the only schools remaining
which attempt to do this are harassed by the federal govern-
ment. The Title IX regulations are a serious step in the wrong
direction.
The teaching of honesty, integrity and chastity must not be-
come exclusively the province of religion. If our government
not only abandons the advocacy of moral standards, but posi-
tively prohibits the practice of such values at teaching insti-
tutions, as these regulations appear to do, the destruction of
America as a great nation will be both imminent and inevita-
ble."'
IV. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS IN THE TITLE IX REGULATIONS
A. Marital and Parental Status
For many private institutions, perhaps the most trouble-
some sections in the Title IX regulations are those concerning
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief Religious:
U.S. v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CoRNFiL L. Q. 231 (1965), for a
discussion of how "unorthodox" religious beliefs could fall within the protections of the
first amendment.
' West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1975, at 10, col. 1; Braden, What Was Wrong With Their
Education, Washington Post, April 17, 1974, at 19, col. 1; and N.Y. Times, April 18,
1975, at 27, col. 1, which reported that a Gallup Poll "found that 79% of those inter-
viewed supported instruction on morals and moral behavior, while 15% opposed it."
m 121 CONG. REc. S20,254 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (notification. of Brigham
Young University policy of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, placed in
Congressional Record by Sen. Buckley).
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marital and parental status.2" Educators have been outspoken
in their opposition to these sections" which in effect require
schools to view sexual issues through amoral glasses even
though many institutions have religious and moral principles
which prevent such a view. One educator expressed the follow-
ing concern:
[T]he government tries to force a private institution to treat
childbirth as a simple biological fact, devoid of moral impli-
cations and outside the context of the Christian family. It
denies the institution the right to exercise its judgment in
2 45 C.F.R. § 86.21(c) (1976):
Prohibitions relating to marital or parental status. In determining whether
a person satisfies any policy or criterion for admission, or in making any offer
of admission, a recipient to which this subpart applies:
1) Shall not apply any rule concerning the actual or potential
parental, family, or marital status of a student or applicant which
treats persons differently on the basis of sex;
2) Shall not discriminate against or exclude any person on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, termination of pregnancy, or recov-
ery therefrom, or establish or follow any rule or practice which so
discriminates or excludes;
3) Shall treat disabilities related to pregnancy, childbirth, termi-
nation of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom in the same manner
and under the same policies as any other temporary disability or
physical condition ...
45 C.F.R. § 86.40 (1976) is substantially the same as § 86.21(c), but covers potential
discrimination after the student has already been admitted, including requirement of
a leave policy for students who are pregnant or having an abortion, even if the school
has no such policy for other temporary disabilities. 45 C.F.R. § 86.57 (1976) is substan-
tially the same as sections 86.21(c) and 86.40, but covers employment practices.
21 Letter from Dr. Dennis F. Kinlaw, Asbury College, to alumni (July 7, 1976),
stating:
For four millenia the subjects of marriage, pregnancy, abortion, and the
nature of human personhood have been acknowledged as of religious signifi-
cance. These are crucially religious in character to those of us who stand in
the Judeo-Christian tradition. Yet HEW has now provided us with a regula-
tion . . . that forces colleges and universities to treat these in a non-moral,
non-ethical manner.
See also Letter from Dr. Dallin H. Oaks, Pres., Brigham Young University, to Martin
H. Gerry, Director of Office of Civil Rights (April 10, 1976); 121 CoNG. REc. S20,254
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (notification of Brigham Young University Policy of Non-
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, placed in Congressional Record by Sen. Buckley);
and 122 CONG. REc. E3,498 (daily ed. June 21, 1976) (memorandum of Dr. Willis D.
Weatherford, Pres. of Berea College, placed in the Congressional Record by Rep. Tim
Lee Carter).
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personnel matters of seeking and retaining staff members
who exercise Christian virtues as role models for students. 29
This concern is typical of many schools which attempt to teach
more than the three R's, especially those institutions which
cannot receive the religious exemption under section 86.12.2 °
The regulations which prohibit institutions from suspend-
ing or refusing to admit a student or employee on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or termination of pregnancy,1' 1 are par-
ticularly burdensome. An institution cannot refuse to hire a
teacher or admit a student on the grounds that the applicant
is pregnant or has had an abortion. Neither can the institution
suspend or terminate the student or teacher who becomes preg-
nant or has an abortion after becoming part of the institution
even though such a circumstance may be a violation of the
institution's stated moral standards. The feeling was expressed
from the floor of the U.S. Senate that this is an intrusion into
the school's protected domain:
Under [§ 86.21(c)], an educational institution cannot refuse
admission to unwed, pregnant students. It is not asserted
herein whether educational institutions should, or should
not, adopt such a policy. It is however contented [sic] that
they have a perfect right to do so if they choose, and neither
the United States Constitution [equal protection] . . . nor
title IX prohibits them from doing so. 2
This paper makes no attempt to determine what is moral,
but in light of Geduldig, Gilbert and the religious and aca-
demic freedoms provided by the first amendment, it seems
clear that institutions should be allowed to make their own
decisions about questions such as pregnancy and abortion.
Geduldig and Gilbert have already decided that pregnancy
may be a valid criterion for treating one group differently from
another group. Whether the issue is raised under the equal
2' 122 CONG. REc. E3498 (daily ed. June 21, 1976) (memorandum of President
Willis D. Weatherford, Berea College, placed in the Congressional Record by Rep. Tim
Lee Carter).
See section VA concerning these unfortunate institutions.
" 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.21, 86.40, 86.57 (1976).
22 121 CONG. REc. S12012 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (memorandum of Sen. Jesse
Helms in support of Concurrent Resolution No. 46).
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protection clause 33 or an act of Congress, 23' these two Supreme
Court decisions leave little doubt that a school can dismiss or
refuse to admit or hire a student or employee on the basis of
pregnancy. Yet the Title IX regulations maintain that preg-
nancy must be treated as any other temporary disability. 23s
HEW has relied on Title VII as the guide in making such a
determination. 23 1 Under Title VII, classifications based on
pregnancy had been considered discriminatory, 23 but the re-
cently decided Gilbert case has eliminated that position and it
is now clear that under Title VII pregnancy may be a valid
criterion for classifying persons. The Title IX regulations are
thus left with no legal basis for their requirement that pregnan-
cies be treated as any other temporary disability.
However, the pregnancy and abortion questions raised by
the Title IX regulations are apparently moot. Most institutions
which would object to these provisions will be exempt from
them under section 86.12.23 HEW has further stated that none
of the provisions are violated as long as an institution's policy
concerning pregnancy and abortion is evenly applied to mem-
bers of both sexes. 239 Those institutions without a religious ex-
emption, therefore, are permitted to dismiss a woman who is
pregnant outside of wedlock as long as they also dismiss the
father-to-be. This position makes the legal problems in the
pregnancy and abortion sections moot as long as HEW contin-
ues its present enforcement policies. 40
213 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
211 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, No. 74-1589 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 1976).
21 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.21(c)(3), 86.40(b)(4), 86.57(c) (1976).
2u See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972), where Title VII requires treatment of preg-
nancy as a temporary disability.
n' See cases cited in note 103 supra.
23 Such an example is Brigham Young University, which was granted exemptions
from section 86.21(c), section 86.40(b)(1)(5) and section 86.57(b). Presently, however,
HEW reports that only "two or three" such schools have been granted a religious
exemption, since the religious exemption is a "low prority" for HEW. Telephone
conversation with Al Hamlin, HEW, Office of Civil Rights (Nov. 10, 1976).
"I Letters from Martin H. Gerry, Director of Office of Civil Rights, to President
Dallin H. Oaks, Brigham Young University (May 17, 1976, and Aug. 12, 1976).
2,0 It has been suggested that suspensions or dismissals based upon a student's
pregnancy should be allowed in only limited circumstances in light of the serious
emotional and social problems caused by such dismissals. Comment, Implementing
Title IX: The HEW Regulations, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 806, 832-33 (1976); cf. Ordway v.
Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971). One commentator on the issue of
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Another problem concerns the general prohibition in the
Title IX regulations of inquiring about a student's or em-
ployee's marital status." ' Institutions may inquire about the
sex of an applicant, 42 but not their marital status. Presumably
HEW believes that such inquiries amount to discrimination.
Yet marital status is often a legitimate area of inquiry where
such information is needed not to discriminate but to properly
evaluate the fitness of the teacher for the position at the reli-
gious institution. Inquiry about a pregnant applicant's marital
status is proper for religious institutions that believe marriage
to be a "God-ordained relationship. ' 243 Yet this inquiry is for-
bidden under the Title IX regulations. This violates an institu-
tion's first amendment rights to religious and academic free-
dom. In the context of private institutions at least, the right of
educators to make moral judgments should be a protected first
amendment right. Educators should have the right to put be-
fore their students "examples of marital success and stabil-
ity," 244 but the Title IX regulations forbid them this right.
B. Institutional Rules
Rules of appearance and behavior are now forbidden at
educational institutions if they differentiate between the
sexes. 25 The practical effect of these governmental intrusions
onto the campus will be determined by the performance of
student dismissals for pregnancy has stated: "The validity of such moral censorship
is open to serious question on first amendment grounds ... " 124 U. PA. L. Rav.,
supra at 832 (1976).
241 45 C.F.R. § 86.21(c)(4) (1976) (pre-admission inquiries concerning marital sta-
tus prohibited); id. at § 86.60(a) (pre-employment inquiries concerning marital status
prohibited).
2"2 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.21(c)(4), 86.60(b) (1976).
243 CHRISTIArry TODAY, Nov. 5, 1976, at 18.
244 Id.
245 Relevant sections of 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1976) include:
86.31(b) -. .. a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
(4) Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions,
or other treatment;
(5) Discriminate against any person in the application of any rules of ap-
pearance.
86.32 Housing.
(a) Generally, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, apply different rules
or regulations . . . related to housing . ...
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HEW in enforcing the regulations. Strict enforcement could
force major changes at institutions which presently acknowl-
edge differences between men and women in their rules.
The regulations deny schools the right to maintain differ-
ing "rules of appearance. ' 4 This apparently means that a
school could maintain appearance rules, such as hair length
requirements, only if the school can obtain a religious exemp-
tion by showing that section 86.31(b)(5) conflicts with a reli-
gious tenet.247 Dress codes are also forbidden, but standards of
dress can be imposed as long as they are based on general
criteria of neatness and modesty which apply equally to both
sexes.
21
The offensive thing about this section is not that women
will now be allowed to wear pants or men will now be allowed
to wear long hair. The odious aspect of this section is that HEW
is attempting to push private colleges which still enforce such
seemingly ancient rules into a mold. This prohibition of rules
of appearance attacks the private colleges which are so impor-
tant to American educational diversity.2 9 Since large, state-
operated universities no longer have appearance requirements
which violate the Title IX requirements, the only potential
violators are private schools which attempt to maintain a
unique atmosphere and character on their campus.
HEW bureaucrats assume that such rules are purely dis-
criminatory relics of the past. But many private institutions,
often Christian schools which have received no religious ex-
emption from section 86.31(b)(5), see a valid purpose in such
appearance rules as a part of their program to "educate men
to be men and women to be women," 5' recognizing that sexual
roles are part of education and life.2sl
246 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(b)(5) (1976).
247 Brigham Young University has been granted such an exemption with regard
to hair length requirements. Letter from Martin H. Gerry, Director of the Office of
Civil Rights, to President Dallin H. Oaks, Brigham Young University (Aug. 12, 1976).
248 Id.
21' See sections IA and B, supra.
2o Letter from Dr. Dennis F. Kinlaw, President of Asbury College, Wilmore, Ken-
tucky, to the school's alumni (July 7, 1976). Asbury is an example of such a Christian
school.
2' See 121 CONG. REc. S20254 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (notification of Brigham
Young University Policy of Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Sex), where Brigham
Young University declared:
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The regulations also forbid different "rules of behavior"
based on sex.252 This general prohibition, when read together
with the direct prohibition of different housing rules in section
86.32,213 operates to prohibit different curfews for men and
women. This requirement that curfews and other dormitory
rules be the same for men and women indicates again the erro-
neous assumption of HEW that equality means that institu-
tions must ignore differences in the sexes. This section has led
to numerous complaints because many schools attempt "to
provide equal housing to students by providing housing pro-
grams that do indeed recognize sex differences. ' 254 HEW,
through their misconception that different rules are automati-
cally discriminatory, could force colleges and universities to
reduce the security measures taken at women's dormitories. 55
Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky
University '5 held that differing curfews are not necessarily dis-
criminatory. Freshman women at Eastern Kentucky Univer-
sity were subject to curfew requirements not imposed on other
students. By use of the rational basis standard, 57 the Sixth
HEW regulations the University will not follow are:
(4) Section 86.31(b)(5): B.Y.U. will continue to enforce rules of ap-
pearance which differ for men and women because we believe that differ-
ences in dress and grooming of men and women are proper expressions of
God-given differences in the sexes. We will resist the imposition of a unisex
standard of appearance.
Brigham Young University received a religious exemption for this section, thus making
their resistance moot.
212 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(b)(4) (1976).
1 45 C.F.R. § 86.32 (1976) states: "A recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, apply
different rules . . . related to housing."
25 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 159 (statement of Rep. Bill Nichols (Ala.), in
which he pleaded that Auburn University be allowed to continue to provide greater
security measures for women).
215 Fortunately, this is at least one area where HEW may never enforce the regula-
tions, since they realize that to do so would indeed lead to unequal treatment. When
Secretary Weinberger was questioned about the apparent adverse effect of the Title
IX regulations on dormitory rules, he responded:
I would hope that there would not be any mechanistic interpretations [of
Section 86.32] . . . . [There would have to be a challenge raised by men
[and] . . .I would certainly suggest that if any university wishes to provide
additional security for the housing that they continue to do so for women's
housing.
1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 472.
25 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974).
2" See section II supra.
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Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the curfew regulations, con-
cluding that "safety is a legitimate concern of the Board of
Regents and this court cannot say that the regulations in ques-
tion are not rationally related to the effectuation of this reason-
able goal.""25 The HEW regulations have permitted govern-
ment interference in an area that has been judicially recog-
nized as the province of the schools.
Indeed, the Title IX regulations are overly broad in their
coverage of all rules regarding behavior, treatment, and ap-
pearance. "The broad, sweeping nature of these . . . para-
graphs deny any valid distinction relative to behavior, treat-
ment, or appearance between the sexes. Such a view flies in the
face of the position adopted by the Supreme Court . . . .
A wiser policy would be to conform the Title IX regulations to
the Supreme Court's position under which HEW would review
each situation on a case by case basis to determine whether the
institutional rule has any rational relationship to the purpose
of the institution, with a strong presumption in favor of the
rationality of the rule since the institution is in a better posi-
tion than HEW to know what its purposes are.60
V. CONCLUSION
Resolution of the serious problems discussed herein can
only be accomplished if those involved recognize the worthy
goals and ptrposes of their alleged adversaries. Private institu-
tions must be cognizant that the cause promoted by the Title
IX regulations is a good one. HEW must likewise realize the
importance of private education and its principles. Congress
should not lose sight of its ability to settle these conflicts
through enacting more specific legislation.
'" 475 F.2d at 711.
' 121 CONG. REc. S12013 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (memorandum in Support of
Resolution to Disapprove HEW Title IX Regulations, Sen. Jesse Helms).
210 It should be noted that the fourteenth amendment applies only to a state
action. The suggestion here is not that the Supreme Court currently requires HEW to
use the rational basis test, but merely that the same standard applied by the Supreme
Court in fourteenth amendment cases could be effectively used by HEW to evaluate
institutional rules and regulations on behavior and appearance.
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A. Private Education
Private education should recognize the good intentions of
Congress and HEW in attempting to eliminate sex discrimina-
tion. And they should pay more than lip-service to the noble-
ness of the cause. They should develop their own procedures
and plans to eliminate sex discrimination, and comply fully
with the purposes of Title IX, even when the procedures de-
vised by HEW to achieve those purposes are so objectionable
that noncompliance may be required. Private education has
too often been "a caboose on the train of equal rights, rather
than an engine," ' and this is criminal when one considers the
high professional and moral standards which most private in-
stitutions claim to uphold. While many provisions of Title IX
are in obvious conflict with the beliefs of some schools, this
should not deter private institutions from actively pursuing
equal rights for women where no conflict exists. In the past,
private education has "failed its own principles and impover-
ished its own performance by the neglect of large pools of po-
tential academic competence."2 ' Private institutions should
actively recruit women, provide fair procedures within the in-
stitution to deal with complaints, make an annual report on the
status and progress of women at the institution, and in a sense,
develop their own affirmative action programs that answer to
their own conscience rather than HEW. The institution should
then inform HEW of these voluntary efforts to erase sex dis-
crimination and proceed to ignore the federal mandates which
conflict with the moral and philosophic tenets of the institu-
tion.
If such voluntary measures do not satisfy HEW, the pri-
vate institutions may have to undertake legal action to void the
Title IX regulations. No federal agency can make laws.2 3 Their
proper function is to enforce the laws passed by Congress, and
when regulations exceed the scope of such legislation, the regu-
I" Address by Eugene B. Habecker, J.D., Dean of Students, George Fox College,
to National Conference of ACDAM/CADW (June, 1976).
252 SOCIETY, Jan. 1976, at 6, quoting from STUDY OF CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION.
263 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, No. 74-1042 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Mar. 30, 1976); Dixon
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S.
129 (1936).
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lations are void. The powers of an agency like HEW were con-
sidered just last year by the Supreme Court: "The rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency charged with the
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make
law. Rather it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry out
into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute'."26'
The proper relationship between statutes and regulations has
further been defined: "The statute defines the rights of the
[persons involved] and fixes a standard by which such rights
are to be measured. The regulation constitutes only a step in
the administrative process. It does not, and could not, alter the
statute.1215 If the regulations exceed the statutory scope of the
law passed by Congress, they are void, a "mere nullity. ' 268 So
the issue which a court would have to decide is whether HEW's
sex discrimination regulations exceeded the scope and will of
Congress.
As noted earlier, parts of the Title IX regulations appear
to ignore the plain language of Title IX.17 The regulations seem
to "bear little resemblance to Title IX at all . . . [HEW] has
made vague that which was precise, and with the nebulous
legal environment that it has intentionally created, the Depart-
ment now has the latitude to arbitrarily dictate 'law' that will
affect every schoolchild, and student in America.""26 It cer-
tainly seems that the Title IX regulations are open to an ultra
vires attack because they exceed the scope of Title IX.69 The
Supreme Court has upheld the rights of private education on
many past occasions, and private institutions should not now
hesitate to use the courts in an attempt to void the regulations.
2"I Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, No. 74-1042, slip op. at 27 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec.
Mar. 30, 1976) quoting partially from Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965).
285 Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1965) quoting from Manhattan Gen.
Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
2I Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). See also
Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935); Lynch v. Tildeu, 265 U.S. 315 (1926); and
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975).
287 See section HI supra.
M85 121 CONG. REc. S13175 (daily ed. July 21, 1975) (statements of Sen. Jesse
Helms in support of proposed amendments to Title IX).
2 8 See Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 66, at 133 et seq. The term ultra vires
refers to "acts beyond the lawful power of an administrative agency or department."
Id. at 150. An in-depth discussion of this precise issue is contained therein.
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B. Congress
Congress should make better use of the 45 day period
granted by the General Education Provisions Act, during
which time Congress has the right to disapprove regulations. 7"
Congress was given this right in order to act as a buffer between
the unelected federal bureaucracy and the people, but it has
failed to make proper use of it. By Congress' failure to utilize
their watchdog powers, HEW has received the approval of Con-
gress by default.
Senator James Buckley has explained the difficulty of con-
trolling the bureaucracy:
The laws which we enact are distorted beyond recognition by
Federal bureaucrats through their implementing regulations
• . .[W]e cannot hope to undo every bit of regulatory mis-
chief committed by the Federal bureaucracy. The Congress
has neither the time nor the staff to oversee the day-to-day
operations of the entire Federal bureaucracy. We are being
overwhelmed by the sheer mass of Federal regulations. They
confuse us with their number; they confound us with their
complexity; they infuriate us with their disregard for the
rights of citizens and the expressed will of the Congress."'
Because of these problems, Congress should amend the General
Education Provisions Act to lengthen the 45 day waiting period
and become more sensitive to potential abuses of the federal
bureaucracy.
Congress also should not hesitate to enact amendments to
Title IX. Amendments have already been enacted to exempt
fraternities and sororities, groups like the Boy Scouts, and
events like the father-son or mother-daughter banquets. Con-
gress should now scrutinize the possible detrimental effects of
the Title IX regulations on private education.
C. HEW
HEW should take three steps. First, it should "break down
the wall of secrecy that has enveloped the whole process of
o 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1974).
" 121 CONG. REc. S20253 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (statement by Sen. James
Buckley).
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writing regulations .... -2,2 Regulations affecting private edu-
cation should be drafted in full consultation with the educa-
tional community because educators perceive the current pro-
cess as unfair and weighted in favor of HEW:
[P]roposed regulations appear in the Federal Register with-
out warning, forcing harassed educators to drop other duties
in the scramble to submit comments before the 30-day
[comment] period ends. Their efforts too often turn out to
be futile, for the Federal agency which has committed its
honor to specific language it has developed in secret will nat-
urally seek to affirm the validity of its judgments by publish-
ing final regulations with as few changes as possible.23
This is precisely what has happened with the sex discrimina-
tion regulations. The failure of HEW to consult and work with
the educational community from the outset has led to problems
that might have been avoided.
Second, HEW should voluntarily refrain from strict en-
forcement of the Title IX regulations. This suggestion is based
on the assumption that HEW and the women's movement have
alerted educators to the severe problems of sex discrimination.
Private education now seems ready to take the initiative in
promoting equality of opportunity for both sexes. The Carnegie
Council on Education conducted a study which concluded that
it is now time for the federal government to get out of the
affirmative action business. Progress has begun and colleges
can now "carry the initiative far better than the federal govern-
ment and, in doing so, can reduce the burden of federal control
before [it becomes] too overwhelming and too permanent." 24
Unfortunately, the Title IX regulations do not "reduce the bur-
den of federal control, 2 5 and indeed they have increased the
burden and scope of federal regulatory power.
272 Address by Charles B. Saunders, Jr., Director of Governmental Relations,
American Council on Education, to Southern Regional Meeting of the College Entr-
ance Examination Board (Feb. 19, 1976).
273 Id.
z1 This study further concluded that: "New forces have been set in motion. New
directions have been identified. Attitudes have been changed, behavior modified, new
habits introduced. The next stage calls for more action by higher education itself."
Address by Saunders, supra note 272, quoting from CARNEGIE COMMSSION ON EDUCA-
TION, INSTITUTIONAL AID: FEDERAL SUPPORT TO COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1972).
275 Id.
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Third, HEW should appreciate and respect the import-
ance of private education's constitutional right to set their own
priorities. 8 Perhaps the crux of this whole conflict is that the
priorities of the federal government for higher education, which
are social justice and equal opportunity2" differ from the priori-
ties of academic excellence set by educators. One educator has
stated that "[h]igher education should have no priority ahead
of the search for truth and the perfection of learning,"I' s not
even social justice.
HEW should review the Supreme Court cases which guar-
antee to private education the right to set its own educational
priorities. Rep. Edith Green, original author of Title IX, echoed
the position of the Supreme Court when she stated to her col-
leagues: "I think we ought to respect the autonomy of the insti-
tutions and let the institutions determine their own priorities
and needs."' Instead, the Title IX regulations issued by HEW
threaten rather than respect the autonomy of private educa-
tion. They should thus be resisted "by all legal means. '20
Tim Philpot
27 See section IC, supra.
Address by Dallin H. Oaks, supra note 14, quoting from CARNEGIE COMAISSION
ON EDUCATION, INSTITUTIONAL AID: FEDERAL SUPPORT TO COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
(1972). This report stated that: "the highest single priority for federal funding in higher
education in the 1970's is to help fulfill the two-century-old American dream of social
justice." Id. at 2.
27 Address by Pres. Dallin H. Oaks, Brigham Young University, to The National
Assoc. of College and University Attorneys (June 18, 1976).
21 117 CONG. REc. 39259 (1971).
20 See Hillsdale College Resolution, supra note 149.
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